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Abstract
The effect of changes in demographic structure on medium-run trends of key mac-
roeconomic variables is estimated using a Panel VAR of 21 OECD economies. The
panel data variability assists the identification of direct effects of demographics, while
the dynamic structure uncovers long-term effects. Young and old dependants are found
to have a negative impact while workers contribute positively. We propose a theoret-
ical model, highlighting the relationship between demographics, innovation and growth,
whose simulations match our empirical findings. The current trend of population aging
and reduced fertility is found to reduce output growth and real interest rates across
OECD countries.
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1. Introduction
The slow recovery after the great recession and the disappointingly slow growth of pro-
ductivity in the last decade has fostered the debate on the medium to long-run prospects
of developed economies and the danger of secular stagnation. This debate has centred on
two main topics: the production of new ideas and the structural characteristics that can be
important in shaping future economic conditions. There is disagreement about the rate of
production of new ideas with Gordon (2012, 2014) being more pessimistic while, amongst
others, Fernald and Jones (2014) and Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011) being more optimistic.
The importance and impact of structural characteristics are more widely accepted. Gordon
(2012, 2014) and Fernald and Jones (2014), looking particularly at the U.S., stress the im-
portance of educational attainment and demography. The effects of demographic changes
on labour supply are often mentioned as one of the ‘headwinds’ of the observed slowdown
in macroeconomic performance in advanced economies. Although important, this interpret-
ation restricts the potential impact of demographic changes on the macroeconomy. In this
paper we take a more general view, arguing that changes in demographic structure, defined
as variations in proportions of the population in each age group from year to year, matter
more generally for macroeconomic activity and may also be related to the production of ideas
as recognized by Kuznets (1960). He argued that medium term variations in growth rates
are linked with both population growth and associated evolution of demographic structures
(Kuznets cycles).
As Figure 1 illustrates, advanced economies are undergoing major changes in the age
profile of their populations due to reduced fertility and increased longevity. First, we observe
that although the proportion of the population in the working age group (20− 59) is similar
in 1970 and 2030, at 50% and 48% respectively, it initially increased to around 56% in
2003 before starting to decline again (age profiles for working age groups are hump-shaped).
Second, the average proportion of the population aged 60+ across our sample is projected to
increase from 16% in 1970 to 29% in 2030, with most of the corresponding decline experienced
in the 0 − 19 group. Moreover, United Nations (2015) reports that although “Europe has
the greatest percentage of its population aged 60 or over (24 per cent) in 2015, rapid ageing
will occur in other parts of the world as well, so that, by 2050, all major areas of the world
except Africa will have nearly a quarter or more of their populations aged 60 or over”.
Kuznets (1960) long ago stressed in detail the importance of demographic structure
where the population is a producer, a saver and a consumer and changes in the demographic
structure may affect the medium and long-term macroeconomic prospects. In this line of
thought, age characteristics of population matters since different age groups (i) have different
savings behaviour, according to the life-cycle hypothesis; (ii) have different productivity
2
levels, according to the age profile of wages; (iii) work different amounts, the very young
and very old tend not to work, with implications for labour input; (iv) contribute differently
to the innovation process, with young and middle age workers contributing the most; and
(v) provide different investment opportunities, as firms target their different needs. Given
the scale of the age profile shifts observed and the relevance of increasing our understanding
of the link between the economy’s structural features and its future prospects, this paper
investigates both empirically and theoretically the effects of changes in demographic structure
on the macroeconomy by looking particularly at their impact on medium to long-term trends.
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Figure 1: (Unweighted) Sample Mean Proportions in each Age Group by Year - Source:
United Nations
In the first part of the paper we present empirical evidence on the short and long-term
relevance of demographic structure for the macroeconomy. While the theoretical literature
and most economic commentary on policy strongly emphasise the importance of demographic
structure, the econometric evidence for its importance is less compelling. There are a number
of reasons for this. First, changes in demographic structure are low frequency phenomena,
difficult to distinguish from other low frequency trends that dominate economic time series.
1 Second, the vector of proportions in each age group is inevitably highly collinear, making
precise estimation of the effect of each age group difficult. Hence it is common to impose
strong restrictions on the effect of the age structure, for instance through the use a single
variable, the dependency ratio. Finally, empirical models that impose a single (equation)
relationship between a set of variables including demographics and a dependent variable of
interest will be inevitably unsatisfactory to capture general equilibrium effects and will likely
underestimate the marginal contribution of demographic transitions.
1Mueller and Watson (2015) discuss low-frequency econometrics. However, their concern, with the iden-
tification of low frequency trends in time-series is rather different from our concern with measuring the effect
of slowly moving variables on macroeconomic activity using the cross-section variability.
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Our empirical strategy attempts to address these issues by estimating a system of dynamic
equations utilising a large panel of OECD countries over a sample period 1970-2007. The
panel data variability assists the identification of the direct relationship between age groups
and the core variables in our system, enabling us to use as much detail on demographics as
data feasibility permits. The dynamic nature of our VAR allows us to estimate the long-run
effects of the demographic movements transmitted through the whole system. As such our
methodology uncovers any long-run association between the slowly changing demographic
age profile and the macroeconomy. In our benchmark model, the demographic structure
can plausibly be considered an exogenous process (the high birth rate that produced the
baby-boomers after 1945 is unlikely to be influenced by growth rates 30 years later) and
is represented by shares of age groups (0 − 9, 10 − 19, . . . , 70+) in total population. The
system of macroeconomic variables include: real output, investment, savings, hours worked,
real interest rates, and inflation. We additionally introduce two exogenous controls: oil prices
and population growth. We analyse two extensions to the benchmark case: in the first, the
empirical model recognises the importance of innovation activities for capital and labour
productivity and their impact on the macroeconomy. In the second, demographic structure
is represented more parsimoniously and consists of three age groups (young, working-age
and retirees).
We find that the variation in the age profiles across OECD countries has economically
and statistically significant impact on all key macroeconomic variables. By allowing for
the indirect feedbacks of the changes in age profile on the variables of interest we show
that the long-term effects are stronger than their short-term counterparts. Crucially, we
find that the impact of age profile changes follows a life-cycle pattern: that is, dependant
cohorts tend to have a negative impact on all real macroeconomic variables including real
returns and add positive inflationary pressures in the long run. The opposite is observed for
working-age cohorts. Although we have not imposed any restrictions on the coefficients of
each proportion of the population in different age groups we find that their joint significance
is always stronger when combining working age groups or dependant groups. As such we
estimate a more parsimonious model including just three age groups (young, adults and old
dependants), which confirms our main results. Finally, the inclusion of patent applications as
a proxy for innovative activities does not alter our benchmark results for the macroeconomic
short and long-term dynamics. Moreover, we find evidence of demographic structure effects
on innovative activities, with middle-aged workers (40-49) having a strong positive impact
on patent applications, significantly higher than older workers, while dependants contribute
negatively. Thus, the aging of the population may result in lower rates of innovation.
We use the United Nations (UN) population predictions and our long-run estimates to
perform country specific prediction exercises. Firstly we contrast the impact of demographic
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changes during the previous and the current decade on trend output growth. We find that
for all countries in our sample the changes in age profile will lead to a statistically and
economically significant drop in trend growth. The average annual long-term output growth
is expected to be reduced by 0.99 percentage points in Japan and 0.92 in the U.S. More
generally, the expected average path of output growth and real interest rates from 2000
until 2030 highlights the downward pressure on these variables as a result of the decrease in
working-age population and increase in proportion of retirees expected during this period.
We finally evaluate how an economy would respond to a temporary increase in fertility
using the dynamic properties of our VAR. We find a distinct life-cycle pattern with growth,
investment and interest rates dropping as fertility increases, recovering as the proportion of
working age population increases and falling again as the weight of old dependants increase.
In the second part of the paper we develop a theoretical model to match the observed
life-cycle characteristics we find in the data and use it to study the main mechanisms through
which demographic changes affect the macroeconomy. We construct an economic environ-
ment incorporating (i) life-cycle properties, allowing for three generations of the population
(dependant young, workers and retirees) with investment in human capital and (ii) endo-
genous productivity and medium-term dynamics. As such, we can study the long-term
interaction between demographic changes and savings, investment and innovation decisions,
which in turn shape the evolution of output growth. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the first to combine a life-cycle model with demographic transitions and medium
run considerations.
Our model highlights three channels through which age profiles affect the macroeconomy.
Firstly, changes in fertility and the implicit cost of taxing workers affect investment in human
capital. Secondly, aging affects the saving decision of workers and through that real interest
rates. Finally, reflecting our empirical findings the share of young workers impacts the
innovation process positively and, as a result, a change in the demographic profile that skews
the distribution of the population to the right, leads to a decline in innovation activity.
The calibrated theoretical model replicates most of the dynamics established in our panel
VAR. A relative increase in the share of young dependants and retirees decreases output
growth and investment while an increased share of workers does the opposite. A perman-
ent increase in longevity (increase in life expectancy) leads to increased growth rates in the
short-term as the decrease in the workers’ marginal propensity to consume leads to lower real
interest rate and an increase in innovative activity. However, as the share of young work-
ers decreases, productivity in innovation decreases leading to a permanently lower output
growth and share of investment over output. Finally, feeding the UN population predictions
for different countries into the model, we match well the results of the prediction exercise
conducted in the empirical part. Increases in average age and reduced fertility are found to
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be strong forces reducing long-term output growth and real rates across OECD countries.
Related Literature
Our work is related to a large empirical literature on the effects of demography on mac-
roeconomic variables. Several studies that look at these effects, measure the changes in age
structure by a single statistic; typically, the proportion of the population of working age (or
dependency ratios) or a measure of life expectancy.2 A number of other contributions, like
ours, focus on a more granular representation of the age structure. Fair and Dominguez
(1991) and Higgins (1998) use a low order polynomial function to describe the age distri-
bution shares and examine the effect of demographics on various macro variables, the first
concentrating on the U.S. and looking at consumption, money demand, housing investment
and labour force participation while the second looking at savings, investment and current
account, using 5-year averages, in a panel of countries. The impact of demographic profile
is found to be highly significant. Lindh and Malmberg (1999) consider the impact of age
structure in a transitional growth regression on a panel of 5-year periods in OECD countries.
They find that growth of GDP per worker is strongly influenced by the age structure, with
50-64 year olds having a positive influence and the 65-plus age group a negative one. Finally,
Feyrer (2007) considers the age structure of the workforce, rather than the population as a
whole, and its impact on productivity and hence output. Our approach differs from these
in at least two crucial ways: first, we use annual data rather than 5-year averages, and
second, having a larger sample enable us to estimate a panel VAR rather than an individual
equation thus allowing for interaction effects between key macro-variables and for the joint
examination of these effects on key macroeconomic variables and growth. Incorporating
those interactions generates a methodology that potentially captures general equilibrium ef-
fects. Miles (1999) has a careful discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the use
of different types of evidence to assess the impact of demographic change and argues for the
use of calibrated general equilibrium models.3
On the theoretical side, the framework developed here incorporates demographic het-
erogeneity, building on Gertler (1999), Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965)4 and endogen-
ous productivity models, following Comin and Gertler (2006) and Romer (1990). As such,
changes in demographic structure can be analysed in general equilibrium and a distinction
2A non-exhaustive list includes Higgins and Williamson (1997) studying the dependency hypothesis for
Asia, Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay (2007) looking at life expectancy and growth forecast and Go´mez
and He´rnandez de Cos (2008) looking at mature workers and global growth.
3Other interesting studies that focus on effects of demography are Jaimovich and Siu (2009) and Park
(2010). The first examines the impact of demography, particularly differentiating volatility of hours worked
across age groups, on business cycle volatility in the G7 countries. The second examines the impact of age
distribution on stock market price-earnings ratios in the US.
4See Ferrero (2010), Carvalho and Ferrero (2013) and Sterk and Tenreyro (2013) for other contributions
that incorporate demographic heterogeneity in a similar way.
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between short-run (within a business cycle framework) and medium-run effects (that incor-
porates the interaction between macro variables and growth) can be explored. Our work is
also related to the Alvin Hanson’s recently popularised argument on whether mature eco-
nomies are experiencing a long lasting stagnation due to permanently low demand. Most of
this literature currently focuses on the effects of aggregate demand externalities in periods
of financial deleveraging that may lead to prolonged periods of lower real rates of return
(furthermore, these effects are amplified the lower the population and productivity growth
rates, see Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) and Jimeno (2015)). By linking demographic
changes and future low real interest rates and output growth, our results provide further
indication that OECD economies are more likely to experience episodes where aggregate
demand externalities may lead to stagnation in the following decades.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The data and the econometric
framework used are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents our empirical results, looking
at the panel VAR estimates for the benchmark model and the extension including a measure
of innovation activities. Section 4 introduces the theoretical framework while the simulation
results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and econometric model
The annual dataset covers the period 1970-2007. Population data was obtained from
the United Nations - World Population, 2010. Age compositions are calculated using the de
facto population in the age group indicated and the percentage it represents with respect to
the total population. It is important to note that UN populations data effectively captures
those living in a specified country and not only its citizens, thus explicitly accounts for legal
immigration. The annual data on savings and investment rates were calculated from nominal
GDP, investment and savings series obtained from the OECD, which also supplied the data
on hours worked. Annual data on policy rates and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) were
obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. Per-capita GDP growth
rates were calculated from per-capita real GDP obtained from Penn World Tables.
The 21 countries covered by our dataset are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. For
some countries data is not available over the whole period, so the panel is unbalanced. Data
on hours are only available for Austria from 1995-2007, for Greece from 1983-2007 and for
Portugal from 1986-2007. Savings and investment rates for Switzerland are only available
from 1990-2007. All other countries have full datasets.5
5Though it would also be desirable to include Germany and Turkey as mature OECD economies, we
7
We have data for countries, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , for years t = 1, 2, ..., T. For data on age
structure Park (2010) uses age by year, and restricts the shape of their effect, but given the
lack of data for many countries we use age by decade. With only 8 demographic proportions
and a fairly large panel we chose not to restrict the age coefficients. Denote the share of age
group j = 1, 2, ..8 (0 − 9, 10 − 19, . . . , 70+) in total population by wj,i,t and suppose the
effect on the variable of interest, say xi,t, takes the form
xi,t = α +
8∑
j=1
δjwj,i,t + ui,t.
Since
∑8
j=1wj,i,t = 1, there is exact collinearity if all the demographic shares are included.
To deal with this, we restrict the coefficients to sum to 0, use (wj,i,t − w8,i,t) as explanatory
variables and recover the coefficient of the oldest age group from δ8 = −
∑7
j=1 δj. We denote
the 7 element vector of (wj,i,t − w8,i,t) as Wi,t.
Our benchmark estimation includes six endogenous variables. They are: the growth rate
of the real GDP, gi,t, the share of investment in GDP, Ii,t, the share of personal savings
in GDP, Si,t, the logarithms of hours worked per capita, Hi,t, the real short-term interest
rate, Ri,t, and the rate of inflation, pii,t. We denote the vector of these six variables as
Yi,t = (gi,t, Ii,t, Si,t, Hi,t, rri,t, pii,t)
′.6 In an extension (section 3.4) we analyse the link
between demographic structure and innovation, incorporating a proxy for R&D activities.
As such we include log of per capita residential patent applications (R&DPA), as reported
by the World Bank, utilizing a vector of seven variables given by Yi,t = (gi,t, Ii,t, Si,t, Hi,t,
rri,t, R&D
PA
i,t , pii,t).
There are likely to be complicated dynamic interactions between our main six economic
variables and literature suggesting an appropriate model for panel data is scarce. In Sec-
tion 5 we present a theoretical general equilibrium model which allows for a range of these
interactions, which we calibrate in terms of the deep parameters of the system, say θ. In
principle, one might consider estimating a linearised version of the system which would be
a structural system of the form
Φ0 (θ)Yt = Φ1 (θ)Et(Yt+1) + Φ2 (θ)Yt−1 + Γ (θ)Wt + εt. (1)
If all the eigenvalues of A (θ) and (I −Φ1 (θ)A (θ))−1Φ1 (θ) lie strictly inside the unit circle,
exclude Germany due to reunification and Turkey due to incomplete demographic data. However, we include
predictions for Germany in the tables.
6The Schwarz Bayesian information criterion indicated that the specification excluding wealth gives a
better fit. Hence, wealth, although potentially important to explain savings, has been excluded from the
benchmark specification.
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where A (θ) solves the quadratic matrix equation
Φ1 (θ)A (θ)
2 − Φ0 (θ)A (θ) + Φ2 (θ) = 0, (2)
then there is a unique and stationary solution given by
Yt = A (θ)Yt−1 + Φ−10 (θ) Γ (θ)Wt + Φ0 (θ)
−1 εt or (3)
Yt = a+ AYt−1 +DWt + ut.
Identifying and directly estimating the structural system is likely to be difficult. There-
fore we estimate the solution or reduced form of the system and assume that conditional on
the exogenous variables, it can be written as a VAR like (3). Notice that since the estim-
ated matrices relative to A and D will be a complicated non-linear function of all the deep
parameters, θ, it will be difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients. However, our object-
ive in the empirical section is primarily to provide predictions of the long-run effect of the
demographic variables and the same predictions would be obtained from any just identified
structural model such as (3). Over-identifying restrictions, if available and correct, would
increase the efficiency of the estimation, but given that we have a large panel that seems a
secondary consideration. Instead we will compare the simulation results from our theoretical
model of Section 5 with the main implications of the estimated empirical model.
The general model described above is for a single country. We consider a Panel VAR and
thus we have vectors Yit and Wit for countries i = 1, 2, ..., N. We assume slope homogeneity
across countries but allow for intercept heterogeneity through ai and estimate a one-way
fixed effect panel VARX(1) of the form:
Yit = ai + AYi,t−1 +DWit + uit, (4)
including additionally two controls: lagged oil price and population growth. The first ac-
counts for common trends across countries and the second allows us to evaluate the mac-
roeconomic dynamics induced by the composition of the demography (Wit) rather than the
impact of an increase or decrease in the population. A is the 6 × 6 parameter matrix of
lagged macroeconomic variables and D is the 6× 7 matrix of coefficients of the demographic
variables. Our estimate of the effect of the demographic variables is then the marginal effect
after having controlled for lagged Yit, the oil price and population growth.
7
Slope heterogeneity is undoubtedly important and it can have unfortunate consequences
7Implicitly we are assuming either that all the variables are stationary or that a flexible unrestricted VAR
will capture stationary combinations by differencing or cointegrating linear combinations. Phillips and Moon
(1999) and Coakley, Fuertes, and Smith (2006) suggest that spurious regression may be less of a problem in
panels.
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in dynamic panels. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that it biases the coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable towards one and the coefficient of the exogenous variable towards zero.
Moreover, estimating heterogeneous slopes based on relatively few degrees of freedom may
result in poorly determined parameters and is likely to produce outliers. We found this to
be the case when we experimented with VARs for each country. Finally, Baltagi and Griffin
(1997) and Baltagi, Griffin, and Xiong (2000) show that the homogeneous estimators tend to
have better forecasting properties. As a result, since our main aim is to predict the variables
conditional on demographics, the homogeneous estimators may provide better predictors of
this demographic contribution.
One of the key assumptions of our estimation is that the demographic structure is exogen-
ous to the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables. We find that the demographic
variables show very low frequency variation relative to annual macroeconomic time-series
and the elements are highly correlated, as such, their time series variability is not contrib-
uting much to the identification of D. In the robustness section we test for this exogeneity
assumption by running a VAR with both vectors Yit and Wit treated as endogenous. Thus,
we estimate [
Yit
Wit
]
= ai +
[
Aendo Dendo
B1 B2
][
Yi,t−1
Wi,t−1
]
+ uit (5)
where Aendo and Dendo are the counterpart of A and D when demographics is considered en-
dogenous, B2 is the parameter matrix of lagged demographic weights and B1 is the parameter
matrix that links past macroeconomic variables and demographic weights. The exogeneity
test verifies whether matrix B1 is equal to zero. Although some parameters in B1 are pre-
cisely estimated and found to be different from zero, they are all rather small, thus changes
in Yi,t−1 do not significantly (economically) affect Wit, validating our exogeneity assumption.
These results are discussed in the robustness section.
The panel variability is crucial for the identification of the short-run impact of demo-
graphics. The fixed effect (or within group) estimator, that we use can be written in the
form of deviations from the country means of the variables. Thus it does not use the cross
section (between) relationship linking the average values of the variables across countries.
However in calculating the FE estimator even though we have removed the between group
variation in the means, we benefit from the much greater range variance of the independent
variables which is available in a panel. This panel effect allows us to obtain much more
precise estimates of the demographic effects than would be available from any single time
series. Although our sample only includes OECD countries, this cross-country variation res-
ults from the fact that some countries entered the demographic transition (i.e. Japan and
Sweden) before others (i.e. Spain and Portugal).
Having estimated ai, A and D, from the panel VAR, the long-run moving equilibrium
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for the system (ignoring population growth and oil prices) is then given by
Y ∗it = (I − A)−1 ai + (I − A)−1DWit,
where the effect of the demographic variables is given by DLR = (I − A)−1D, which reflects
both the direct effect of demographics on each variable and the feedback between the en-
dogenous variables. Therefore, the time series element allows us to consider, for instance,
the effects of demography on savings to influence growth through the effect of savings on
growth. We can isolate the long-run contribution of demography to each variable in each
country by obtaining the demographic attractor for the economic variables at any moment
in time
Y Dit = (I − A)−1DWit = DLRWit. (6)
We denote each element in matrix DLR, which is a function of parameters in matrices A and
D, cij(A,D). In order to test whether each element or a sum of those elements in DLR are
significantly different from zero (e.g. H0 : DLR(i, j) = 0 or H0 : cij(A,D) = 0) we utilize a
non-linear Wald test.8 Finally, it is important to distinguish between our long-run estimate
and a long-run steady state. Our estimates provide a long-run forecast for the economic
variables conditional on a particular vector of demographic shares after the completion of
the endogenous adjustment of the economic variables and as such we are measuring the
impact of demographics to the long-run trend of the key macroeconomic variables. However,
as time passes the demographic structure might evolve towards a steady state demographic
distribution. We do not model this process and thus are not providing an estimate of the
effects of this convergence process of current demographic structure to its steady state onto
the macroeconomy.
Before presenting our empirical results it is worth highlighting the main differences of our
empirical specification relative to Higgins (1998) who also studies the quantitative effects of
demographics on the macroeconomy. Firstly, Higgins (1998) directly estimates demographics
on macroeconomic variables in a panel setting and thus for a variable of interest yi,t and
demographic measure di,t, he postulates that yi,t = βdi,t + γxi,t−1.9 Given that some of
the dynamics of the variables of interest is short-term in nature, this estimation procedure
typically includes some controls (xi,t−1) in order to account for the business cycle variations
in yi,t (variables used are, for instance, a productivity measure and output growth) and
as such the parameter β should be interpreted as the effect of demographics on the trend
of the macroeconomic variables of interest; therefore comparable to our matrix DLR. A
8The Wald statistic is given by cij(Aˆ, Dˆ)
T [c′ij(Aˆ, Dˆ)(Vˆ (A,D))c
′
ij(Aˆ, Dˆ)
T ]−1cij(Aˆ, Dˆ)
D−→ χ2Q, where
Vˆ (A,D) is the estimated variance-covariance matrix and c′ij(Aˆ, Dˆ) is the gradient of function cij(Aˆ, Dˆ).
9Interactive terms involving elements of xi,t−1 and di,t might also be used.
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disadvantage of using this empirical strategy is that xi,t−1 might not be sufficient to control
for short-term dynamics and more importantly yi,t and xi,t may be endogenously determined
and jointly affected by low frequency demographic changes. As advocated by Sims (1972), a
VAR is a more appropriate empirical model in that it allows for a wide range of interactions
to be considered. Our empirical model explores these interactions to measure the impact of
demographics. Moreover, (as in our methodology variables are endogenous) we can study the
effects of demographics on output growth instead of using it as a control variable. Secondly,
given the correlation structure of the main variables, Higgins (1998) uses five year averages.
Although demographic changes may reasonably be considered exogenous since these are
mostly related to fertility choices occurred several decades before, using five year averages
might introduce potential biases. Our estimation procedure uses yearly changes and given
that it is appropriately accounting for endogeneity issues, we can explicitly test the validity
of this exogeneity assumption. Finally, while we directly incorporate demographic weights,
Higgins (1998) uses Fair and Dominguez’s (1991) polynomial methodology, parameterising
the effects of demographics.
3. Empirical Results
We start by presenting the results for our benchmark specification including the six
main macroeconomic variables, namely output growth, investment, savings, per capita hours
worked, real interest rates and inflation.
3.1. Panel VAR estimates - Benchmark model
We rely on the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion, SBC, to chose between possible
specifications. On that basis, a one-way fixed effect model with country intercepts was
preferred for every equation to a two-way fixed effect model with country and year intercepts,
but without the oil price. This suggests that cross-section dependence or common trends is
not a major problem with the model, but we investigate the robustness of our results to this
below. A VARX(1) and a VARX(2) had almost identical SBCs. We used a VARX(1) keeping
the model as parsimonious as possible (results for VARX(2) are qualitatively similar).
Table 1 presents the A matrix,10 where each row represents an equation in the panel VAR
representation. We note that hours worked, investment, savings and real rates are highly
persistent and real output and inflation rate are moderately so. Basic Granger causality
tests suggest that all our endogenous variables are Granger causal (with two lags) for most
of the other variables in the system. As such, we seem to capture well the dynamic interac-
10Full estimates together with robust standard errors are shown in the Appendix.
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tions between the main economic variables.11 Finally, the matrix of correlations between the
residuals of each equation of the VAR (presented in the Appendix) shows very strong con-
temporaneous correlations between the residuals of some of the equations possibly reflecting
business cycle effects.
gt−1 It−1 St−1 Ht−1 rrt−1 pit−1
gt 0.212* -0.234* 0.056 0.009 -0.235* -0.252*
It 0.18* 0.778* 0.025 0.011 -0.093* -0.088*
St 0.043 -0.13* 0.806* -0.008 -0.078* -0.071*
Ht 0.288* -0.026 0.047** 0.919* -0.121* -0.092*
rrt 0.042 -0.266* -0.14* 0.039 0.726* 0.152
pit 0.039 0.214** 0.121** -0.007 -0.109 0.561*
Note: ∗∗ = 10%, ∗ = 5% levels of significance.
Table 1: Coefficients - A
Table 2 presents the matrix of short-term demographic impacts (D). As expected the in-
dividual coefficients are not well determined because of collinearity, but the hypothesis that
the coefficients of the demographic variables are all zero is strongly rejected for all equa-
tions.12 Generally the results look plausible, meaning dependant population as represented
by the 0-9, 10-19 and 70+ have in general a negative impact on real output, investment,
savings, hours worked and real rates while working population (20 - 60 groups) generally
have a positive impact. Younger and older generations appear to have a positive impact on
inflation whereas working age groups impact inflation negatively.
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
g -0.063 0.197* 0.185* 0.004 -0.034 0.032 -0.084 -0.236
I -0.069 0.035 0.061 -0.001 -0.058 0.043 0.181* -0.191*
S -0.063 0.146* -0.023 0.099 0.050 0.18* 0.043 -0.431*
H -0.172* -0.029 0.068 0.206* -0.048 0.100 0.002 -0.126
rr -0.463* -0.069 0.180 0.375* 0.259** 0.146 0.243 -0.671*
pi 0.484* 0.141 -0.098 -0.403* -0.341* -0.097 -0.073 0.388
Note: ∗∗ = 10%, ∗ = 5% levels of significance.
Table 2: Short-Run Demographic Impact - Matrix D
Table 3 shows the (I − A)−1D = DLR matrix. We observe that allowing for the dynamics
and interactions strengthens the general impact of demographics, the long-run effects are
much larger. As expected statistical significance for each parameter is difficult to obtain
11Perhaps the most surprising feature is that lagged investment has a negative effect on growth. Nonethe-
less, there is a strong positive contemporaneous correlation between the growth and investment residuals
(See Appendix). For OECD countries Bond, Leblebiciog˘lu, and Schiantarelli (2010) found a small positive
effect in the bivariate relationship.
12Details are shown in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.
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(only 10 out of 48 elements of DLR is significant) given that each element in DLR is a
function of 42 estimated parameters (matrix A and a column of matrix D). However, each
demographic weight is related to the overall age structure, when one weight increases, others
must be decreasing, thus it is important to evaluate the overall pattern of how demographics
may affect the macroeconomy. As identified in the short-run impact matrix, dependants
tend to have a negative impact on real output, investment, savings, hours worked per capita
and real rates while working age population generally have a positive impact (the opposite
for inflation). We thus test the joint significance of the parameter for workers, dependants
and their difference. Note that most contributions that look at the impact of demographics
also advocate that the relationship between demographics and the macroeconomy should
consider the impact of the entire age structure. Fair and Dominguez (1991) in fact assumes a
polynomial representation of such structure prior to estimation, while here we do not restrict
each parameter during the estimation but find that their estimated covariances are such that
the combination of parameters are more precisely estimated than each parameter separately,
confirming the importance of looking generally at changes in demographic structure.
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
g -0.040 0.118 0.093 0.046 0.108 -0.021 -0.304* 0.000
I -0.506 0.195 0.251 0.228 0.023 0.241 0.399 -0.832
S 0.039 0.539** -0.371 0.275 0.381 0.645** -0.126 -1.382*
H -2.024** 0.053 0.498 2.654* 0.295 1.217 -1.567 -1.126
rr -0.895 -0.328 0.507 0.847 0.375 0.149 0.255 -0.910
pi 1.117* 0.656** -0.328 -0.979* -0.749* 0.016 -0.073 0.339
Note: ∗∗ = 10%, ∗ = 5% levels of significance.
Table 3: Long-Run Demographic Impact - DLR
Table 4 shows the results of the joint significance tests (the same Wald test is used
but the new non-linear function is fi(A,D) = cij(A,D) + cik(A,D) for elements j and k
in row i). First, we find the impact of demographics on savings and interest rates gives
support to the life-cycle hypothesis. Savings increase when the share of workers approaching
retirement (30-59) increases and decrease substantially when the share of retirees increase.
Moreover, when the share of dependants (old and young) increase while the weight of workers
decrease, interest rates tend to decrease indicating the marginal propensity to consume out of
income from workers might be falling. Life-cycle effects are also observed for hours worked
per capita. The effect on hours and savings are particularly marked as these are highly
persistent. Investment is negatively affected by young and old dependants and although we
find that workers impact investment positively, the estimates are not precise. Long-term
growth rates are positively affected by working population (20-50) and negatively affected
by dependants (0-9 and 60-69 age groups). In summary our estimation provides evidence
that societies with larger dependant age groups and smaller working age population faces
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in the long-term a statistically significant decline in hours worked, real rates, savings and
investment and higher inflation.
Workers Dependants Difference
g p(
∑5
j=2 δj = 0)=0.056 p(δ1 + δ7 = 0)=0.089 p(
∑5
j=2 δj = δ1 + δ7)=0.050
I p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.276 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.057 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.078
S p(
∑6
j=4 δj = 0)=0.009 p(δ7 + δ8 = 0)=0.027 p(
∑6
j=4 δj = δ7 + δ8)=0.011
H p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.026 p(δ1 +
∑8
j=7 δj = 0)=0.026 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 +
∑8
j=7 δj)=0.015
rr p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.073 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.128 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.072
pi p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.001 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.020 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.003
Table 4: Joint Tests - p-values of Nonlinear Wald Test
3.2. Panel VAR estimates - Three generations
Given that our results show common patterns for dependant and working age groups
we also analyze the link between demographics and the macroeconomic trends considering
a less granular age structure. To this end, we reclassify demographic groups and estimate
the model considering only three demographic groups at any given time. In particular, we
aggregate age groups 0-9 and 10-19 as young dependants, age groups 20-29, 30-39, 40-49 and
50-59 as workers and 60-69, 70+ as older workers and retirees. Of course, this classification
is somewhat coarse. Since the official retirement age in most OECD countries is around 65,
there are some in the 60-69 age group who should actually be in the category of workers.
Similarly, some in the 10-19 age group are also working. However, since our theoretical
model has three groups (youngsters, workers and retirees), these estimates provide a closer
link between theory and empirics.
We start by reporting (Table 5) the long-term demographic effects for these age groups
(β’s). We observe the same patterns as in the benchmark model: the working age group
contributes positively to growth, investment, savings, hours worked and interest rates and the
old dependants, particularly, contribute negatively. Reducing the number of demographic
groups tends to produce more precise parameter estimates with half of the elements in the
matrix being significant at the 10% level. We observe that the demographic effects (β’s)
on investment although with the expected sign are poorly estimated. Given that the pairs
δ1 and δ2, and δ7 and δ8, had opposite effects on investment (see benchmark estimation)
the effects of the 0-9 and 10-19 year old groups, and 60-70 and +70 age groups might be
offsetting each other such that estimates become imprecise. Finally, although the effects on
interest rates for the workers and old dependants are statistically insignificant, they have
the expected sign and the hypothesis that β2 = β3 is rejected with 5% confidence.
Individual Country and Pooled Prediction Exercises
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β1 β2 β3
gt 0.040 0.103 -0.143*
It 0.068 0.091 -0.159
St 0.331* 0.226 -0.558*
Ht -0.703* 1.704* -1.001**
rrt -0.33** 0.627 -0.298
pit 0.752* -0.87* 0.119
Note: ∗∗ = 10%, ∗ = 5% levels of signific-
ance.
Table 5: Long-Run Demographic Impact
Given that this empirical model is the closest to our theoretical setting we use our es-
timates to perform two distinct individual country predictions and a general (pooled across
countries) response to an increase in fertility (baby-boomers). For the individual country ex-
ercises, we utilize the predicted future demographic structure as provided by the UN World
Population Prospects (2010) and feed into our long-run reduced form model to project the
effect of expected changes in demographic structure on the long-run values of our macroeco-
nomic variables. Table 6 provides forecasts of the impact of changes in demographic structure
on average annual GDP growth (in percentage points). The first (second) column shows the
long-run growth rate in 2009 (2019) incorporating the effects of demographic changes from
2000-2009 (2010-2019). The results suggest that in all countries in our sample, as well as
Germany, demographic changes over this decade depress long-term GDP growth. The mag-
nitude of the drop is highly economically significant: for the US, for example, it is 0.92
percentage points and for Japan 0.99. The last column of the table shows the significance
test; the predicted drop in trend GDP growth is statistically significant (highest p-values is
6.3%) for all countries.
We also present the predicted long-term trend of output growth and real rates for selected
countries (the prediction for other countries is shown in the Appendix) for the period 2000
until 2030 in Figure 2. The initial point in the year 2000 is given by the respective average
of the variable for the period 1970-2000. Then at each time τ ∈ [2001, 2030] we depict the
resulting output growth and real rates incorporating the long-run effects of demographic
changes measured from t = 2000 till τ . As it can be seen, demographic changes are expected
to reduce growth and real interest rate in many OECD countries in the next decades; in
some cases we observe negative real interest rates and output growth rates. The effect on
trend output growth in 2030 is always significant at 10%. Given that β3 is not as precisely
estimated for real rates, and most of the predicted demographic changes imply a strong
increase in the weight of old dependants (being compensated by decreases in weights for
both the other groups), we find that the probability that real rates decrease in 2030 across
countries is around 80% to 85%.
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2000-2009 2010-2019 Change Prob(Change>0)
Australia 1.64% 0.95% -0.69% 0.050
Austria 2.05% 1.37% -0.68% 0.038
Belgium 2.03% 1.28% -0.75% 0.056
Canada 1.57% 0.45% -1.12% 0.047
Denmark 1.20% 0.64% -0.57% 0.041
Finland 1.23% 0.18% -1.05% 0.051
France 1.57% 0.73% -0.83% 0.054
Germany 1.66% 0.76% -0.91% 0.048
Greece 1.50% 0.88% -0.63% 0.059
Iceland 2.56% 1.77% -0.80% 0.043
Ireland 3.59% 2.83% -0.76% 0.061
Italy 1.83% 1.23% -0.60% 0.053
Japan 0.92% -0.07% -0.99% 0.050
Luxembourg 1.98% 1.62% -0.37% 0.044
Netherlands 0.51% -0.55% -1.06% 0.046
New Zealand 2.64% 1.87% -0.78% 0.043
Norway 2.77% 2.16% -0.61% 0.042
Portugal 2.19% 1.38% -0.80% 0.043
Spain 1.42% 0.75% -0.67% 0.063
Sweden 0.44% 0.05% -0.39% 0.048
Switzerland 1.54% 0.77% -0.77% 0.042
United Kingdom 1.83% 1.43% -0.40% 0.044
United States 1.93% 1.00% -0.92% 0.051
Table 6: Average Predicted Impact on GDP Growth by Country
Our pooled exercise uses the VARX estimated equation, particularly matrices Aˆ and Dˆ,
and calculate the economy’s response ({Yt}T=80t=0 ) to an exogenous change to demographic
weights (assuming a stationary age structure as starting point) produced by an increase
in fertility that dies out slowly (AR(1) with ρ = 0.9).13 Figure 3 shows the responses to
output growth, investment and real rates and the exogenous changes in our three age groups.
We show the responses for τ = 10 until T = 79 dropping the first 10 years such that some
dynamics between the macroeconomic variables take effect after the initial change in weights
(W ). Furthermore, in order to capture the overall path of the main variables we also show
the trend response, smoothing the discontinuities at decade 20 and 60 when the cohort
impacted by the increase in fertility changes from one age group to the next (see the fourth
plot in Figure 3). The results are in line with the long-run effects depicted in matrices DLR.
An increase in the weight of young dependants tend to depress output, investment and real
rates. As the new cohorts enter the working population, output, investment and interest
rates increase. After 60 years when the affected cohorts start joining the old dependant
group the key variables fall. In section 5 we compare both prediction and pooled responses
obtained empirically against the simulation results from our theoretical model.
13Note that this is not a classic impulse response of a random disturbance commonly used in VARs. The
plots depict responses to changing the exogenous variables (which due to the link between demographic
weights as population ages vary for all t = 0 to t = 80) in our VARX. Nonetheless, in this exercise we explore
the short-term dynamics of our estimated system while in Figure 2 we focus directly on long-run effects.
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Figure 2: Impact of Predicted Future Demographic Structure
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Figure 3: Response to an increase in fertility
3.3. Robustness
Controlling for time effects
As noted above the SBC chose the one-way (country) fixed effect model. There is the
danger that if there are common trends correlated with the demographic variables, these
trends may be wrongly attributed to the demographic variables. A two-way effects model
(with country and year intercepts) avoids this issue by allowing for any global factor influ-
encing all countries.
Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix shows the long-term impact of demographic variables
and the joint significance tests under a two-way fixed effects model, respectively. Comparing
DLR in this estimation with the same matrix obtained in the benchmark estimation reveals
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that long-term demographic effects are generally robust to the chosen effect. We do not
observe any sign reversals and the significant cohorts impacting each macro variable remain
the same. We now find that δ5 is relevant for investment and as such the hypothesis that
δ3 + δ4 + δ5 = 0 is rejected at 10% confidence level. The relationship between saving and
demographics is not as strong as before given that δ6 is no longer significant. We also observe
some attenuation of the effect of demographics on inflation. We conclude that the impact
of demographic variables on the macroeconomy identified by the model is not spuriously
determined by common trends.
Per Capita Output Growth
In this alternative specification we replace output growth by the per capital output growth
(gpci,t). Tables A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix shows the long-term impact of demographic vari-
ables and the joint significance tests, respectively. In general, the alternative model with
per capita output growth has similar demographic effects but estimates are less precise.
Although we observe slightly higher p-values for the joint significant tests, the same conclu-
sions are statistically supported by the data; economies with lower proportion of workers and
higher proportion of dependants will experience lower per capita output growth, investment,
savings and real interest rates.
Exclusion of individual countries
We test the robustness with respect to the selected countries by re-estimating the model
on a dataset with each country excluded in turn. The results remain qualitatively similar,
as are the tests as to whether the demographic variables are significant in each equation.
Structural Change
We also test for potential structural change by estimating the model on sub-periods of
the entire dataset, and selecting the preferred model using the SBC. A single model over the
whole period was preferred over models with structural breaks in any given year for the first
four equations in the VAR - growth, investment, savings and hours worked. For the last two
equations, interest rates and inflation there is evidence of structural breaks around the years
1982 and 1983.14
Exogeneity Test
14Estimating the model over the sample 1984-2007 yields inflation and real interest rate results that differ
somewhat from the full-period estimation, indicating the possible presence of structural instability. The
ranges of the demographic variables for these two periods are also somewhat different. The sub-sample has
a vastly reduced variation in interest rates since the euro member countries in our sample shared a common
rate for part of the period.
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We test the exogeneity of demographic weights to the vector of macroeconomic variables
by estimating a VAR with both vectors Yi,t and Wi,t treated as endogenous, as depicted in
equation (5), and verify whether matrix B1 is equal to zero. The estimated matrix B1 is
shown in the Appendix. Although some parameters in B1 are precisely estimated and found
to be different than zero they are all considerably small. For instance, the highest significant
parameter estimate is 0.011, measuring the effect of interest rates on the proportion of 50-60
year old individuals. That implies that a 100 basis point move in real rates would lead
to a change in that proportion from 10% to 10.001%. We thus conclude that changes in
Yi,t−1 do not significantly (economically) affect Wi,t, validating our exogeneity assumption.
We also find that the diagonal elements of B2 are smaller but close to one, as demographic
weights are very persistent and that matrices Aendo and Bendo are similar to matrices A and
D obtained in the VARX estimation.
3.4. Panel VAR Estimation - Introducing Innovation variables
As mentioned in the Introduction, Kuznets (1960) discusses in detail the relevance of
the native population growth, and hence presence of the young, for innovation activities,
among other factors. Feyrer (2007) examines the link between productivity and demographic
structure and finds strong and robust relationship between these two. In two other papers
(Feyrer (2008), Feyrer (forthcoming)) he suggests two potential channels through which age
structure can affect productivity: innovation and adoption of ideas through managerial and
entrepreneurial activity.15
In this section, in order to account for possible dynamic interactions between demographic
structure and innovation which in turn will affect technological progress, we re-estimate the
model including an additional variable that proxies for R&D activity. To this end, we
utilize World Development Indictors of the World Bank on residential patent applications,
and include the log number of patent applications per capita, (R&DPA), as an additional
variable in our system.16
Table 7 (left panel) gives the (I − A)−1D matrix of long-term demographic impacts
with seven endogenous variables when eight demographics groups are included, while the
right panel show the results when we estimate the model using three demographic groups.
First, the introduction of innovation variable does not affect the main qualitative conclusions
15He shows that in the US innovators’ median age is stable around 48 over the 1975-95 sample period
whereas median age of managers who adopt ideas are lower around the age of 40 and the managerial median
age is affected by the entry of the babyboom generation into the workforce over the years. He argues that
changes in the supply of workers may have an impact on the innovation rate.
16Note that the data for residential patent applications for Australia and Italy are incomplete, therefore
we exclude these countries in our estimations. We also interpolate residential patent applications data for
Japan for the years 1981 and 1982 as there seemed to be anomaly in their data for these two years.
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obtained in the benchmark estimation.17 Second, the results for the 3 generations case
indicate that young dependants and older generations contribute negatively to variations in
patent applications whereas the workers (20-60) contribute positively. Third, in line with the
evidence in Jones (2010) and Feyrer (2008) whereby the age distribution of patent applicants
increases sharply from 30-35 years old, peaks around 45 years old and drops significantly
after 50 years old, we find a strong and statistically significant positive effect of middle-aged
workers (40 - 49) on R&DPA. We also strongly reject the H0 : δ5 + δ6 = δ7 + δ8, as such, as
society ages, with a decline in the proportion of middle-aged workers, the economy innovates
less. As a robustness exercise we also estimate the model with the growth rate of patent
application instead of patents per capita and find that mature workers (40 - 49) contribute
positively while older workers (50-59) contribute negatively, confirming the importance of
middle age workers relative to other age groups to the innovation process. Finally, using
these long-term estimates and UN population predictions we find that the expected aging
in the next two decades may lead to a drop in patent application per capita across OECD
countries of around 20%.
Benchmark Three Generations
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8 β1 β2 β3
g -0.03 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08 -0.05 -0.29** 0.03 0.03 0.10 -0.13**
I -0.55 0.24 0.26 0.26 -0.05 0.24 0.43 -0.83 0.08 0.06 -0.14
S -0.03 0.59 -0.36 0.32 0.40 0.78** -0.19 -1.5* 0.31* 0.28 -0.6*
H -1.71 -0.13 0.46 2.66* 0.43 0.93 -1.27 -1.38 -0.61** 1.73* -1.12*
rr -0.65 -0.75 0.66 0.83 0.51 -0.14 0.50 -0.95 -0.38** 0.68 -0.30
R&DPA -1.88 -6.56 2.67 -0.08 8.78* 1.18 -1.09 -3.02 -3.84* 5.01* -1.17
pi 0.93* 0.91* -0.37 -0.95* -0.95* 0.36 -0.29 0.37 0.78* -0.93* 0.14
Note: ∗∗ = 10%, ∗ = 5% levels of significance.
Table 7: Long-Run Demographic Impact
4. Theoretical Model
In this section we propose a model that accounts for our main empirical findings and
use it to perform different simulations studying the effects of demographic changes. Given
that we are interested in those effects after the completion of the endogenous adjustments
of the economic variables, our modelling framework focuses on demographic heterogeneity
and medium-run dynamics, incorporating life-cycle properties and endogenous productivity
to our economic environment. The economy consists of three main structures: a produc-
tion sector, an innovation sector and households. The production sector comprises a final
17We perform the same joint significance test as in the benchmark case. Although p-values are slightly
higher (particularly for the output growth equation) as each element in DLR is now function of 56 estimated
parameters, instead of 42 as in the benchmark model, the difference of the demographic impact of workers
versus dependants remains significant for all variables (See the Appendix for details).
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good producer, whose factors are differentiated goods (inputs), and input producers, whose
production process employs capital, labour and a composite of intermediate goods. The
number of input producers is endogenously determined, hence entry and exit is permitted.
The composite of intermediate goods aggregates an endogenous set of product varieties, cre-
ated by the innovation process. Product innovation consists of two joint processes. Product
creation (prototypes) or R&D and product adoption, in which prototypes are made ready to
be used in the production process as specialised intermediate goods. Within the household
sector, individuals - who supply labour, accumulate assets and consume - exhibit life-cycle
behaviour, albeit of a simple form. Individuals face three stages of life: young/dependant,
worker and retiree. Finally, there is a zero expected profit financial intermediary to facilitate
the allocation of assets between the household and the production and innovation sectors.
4.1. Production
The final good producer combines inputs from N ft firms, denoted by superscript j. Total
output is thus given by
Yc,t =
[∫ Nft
0
(Y jc,t)
(1/µt)dj
]µt
, (7)
where µt denotes the mark-up of input firms. We assume µt = µ(N
f
t ), µ
′(·) < 0 and that
profits of intermediate good firms Π(µt, Y
j
c,t) must equate operating costs given by ΩΨ˜t,
where Ψ˜t is a scaling factor defined to ensure we obtain a balanced growth path (see below).
Each firm j produces a specialised good using capital (Kjt ), labour (L
j
t) and an interme-
diate composite good (M jt ). Production is given by
Y jc,t =
[
(U jtK
j
t )
α(ξtL
j
t)
(1−α)](1−γI) [M jt ]γI , (8)
where U jt is the utilisation rate, γI the intermediate good share, ξtLt denotes the effective
labour units employed in production and α the capital share of added value. The intermediate
composite good used by firm j aggregates At specialised goods such that
M jt =
[∫ At
0
(M jit )
(1/ϑ)di
]ϑ
. (9)
Each producer of specialized good i acquires the right to market this good via the creation
and adoption process. Total costs of production for firm j are then given by
TC = WtξtL
j
t + (r
k
t + δ(Ut))K
j
t + P
M
t M
j
t
Where Wt is the wage, r
k
t is the rent of capital, δ(Ut) is the capital depreciation rate, with
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δ′(·) > 0, and PMt is the price of the intermediate composite good.
4.2. R&D and Adoption
The creation of intermediate good varieties is divided into two stages: R&D and conver-
sion/adoption.
R&D
Let Zpt be the stock of invented goods for an innovator p. Then at every period an
innovator spends Spt to add new goods to this stock. Each unit spent produces ϕt new
goods. Thus, Zpt+1 is given by
Zpt+1 = ϕtS
p
t + φZ
p
t ,
where φ is the implied product survival rate. In Comin and Gertler (2006) the productivity
of new inventions ϕt is assumed to be given by ϕ
CG
t = χZt[Ψ˜
ρ
t (St)
1−ρ]−1, where χ is a
scale parameter. Thus, it depends on the aggregate stock of invented goods (Zt), so there
is a positive spillover as in Romer (1990), and on a congestion externality via the factor
[Ψ˜ρt (St)
1−ρ]−1, such that, the R&D elasticity of new technology creation in equilibrium is
ρ.18 However, as Kremer (1993) discusses if each individual’s chance of being lucky or smart
enough to invent something is independent of population size, then the number of individuals
working relative to total population will be important to determine the aggregate growth rate
of invented goods in an economy.19 Moreover, Jones (2010) and Feyrer (2008) analyse the age
profile of inventors/innovators and show that young and middle-aged workers contribute the
most to the pace of the innovation process. Our estimation results also suggest that groups
of young/middle age workers (20-29 and 40-49) contribute positively to patent applications
while dependants contribute negatively.20 Consequently, innovation does not seem to be
independent of the demographic structure and particularly the proportion of young/middle
aged workers seems to correlate positively with innovation.
In order to incorporate the importance of the ratio of (young) workers in the innovation
process we assume the productivity of innovation is given by ϕt ≡ (Γywt )ρywχZt[Ψ˜ρt (St)1−ρ]−1,
18As a way to ensure that the growth rate of new intermediate product is stationary, they also assume that
the congestion effect depends positively on the scaling factor Ψ˜t. Thus, everything else equal the marginal
gain from R&D declines as the economy evolves.
19Similarly, in Kuznets (1960)’ words “[...] since we have assumed the education, training, and other
capital investment necessary to assure that the additions to the population will be at least as well equipped
as the population already existing, the proportion of mute Miltons and unfulfilled Newtons will be no higher
than previously. Population growth [...] would, therefore, produce an absolutely larger number of geniuses,
talented men, and generally gifted contributors to new knowledge whose native ability would be permitted
to mature to effective levels when they join the labor force.”
20Liang, Wang, and Lazear (2014), although looking at entrepreneurship and not directly at R&D produc-
tion shows that a high proportion of old workers prevents young workers gaining the necessary knowledge
to start up a new business, thus reducing entrepreneurship.
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where Γywt is a measure of the stock of workers relative to the rest of the population and ρyw
controls the importance of workers to the aggregate productivity of innovation. If ρyw = 0,
the innovation process is equivalent to the one assumed in Comin and Gertler (2006). We
present the definition of Γywt when we discuss the population dynamics below.
Based on that the flow of the stock of invented products becomes
Zpt+1 = (Γ
yw
t )
ρywχZt[(Ψ˜t)
ρ(St)
1−ρ]−1Spt + φZ
p
t . (10)
We assume that innovators borrow Spt from the financial intermediary. Define Jt as the
value of an invented intermediary good. Then, innovator p will invest Spt until the marginal
cost equates the expected gain. Thus,
φE[Jt+1] =
Rt+1
ϕt
. (11)
Where Rt+1 is the interest rate. The realised profits of an innovator is
ΠRDt = φJt(Z
p
t − φZpt−1)− St−1Rt. (12)
Adoption
Let Aqt ⊂ Zqt denote the stock of converted goods ready to be marketed to firms. Adop-
ters (q) obtain the rights of technology from innovators and make an investment expenditure
(intensity) of Ξt to transform Z
q
t into A
q
t . This conversion process is successful with probab-
ility λt. We assume λt = λ
(
Aqt
Ψ˜t
Ξt
)
and λ′(·) > 0, thus more intensity yields more adoptions.
If unsuccessful the good remains in its invented form (prototype). A converted good can be
marketed at every period to firms, thus its value, denoted Vt is given by
Vt = Πm,t + (Rt+1)
−1φEtVt+1, (13)
where Πm,t is the profit from selling an intermediate good to input firms. We can now
determine the value of a unadopted product (Jt). That is
Jt = max
Ξt
−Ξt + (Rt+1)−1φEt[λtVt+1 + (1− λt)Jt+1]. (14)
The stock of unadopted goods at period t is given by (Zqt − Aqt ). Thus, the flow of adopted
goods for an adopter q is
Aqt+1 = λtφ(Z
q
t − Aqt ) + φAqt . (15)
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The expenditure in consumption goods of adopters, financed by borrowing, is given by
Ξt(Z
q
t − Aqt ). (16)
That way the profit of an adopter q is
ΠAt =
∫ Aqt
0
Πm,t − φJt(Zpt − φZpt−1)−RtΞt−1(Zqt−1 − Aqt−1). (17)
4.3. Household Sector
There are a continuum of agents of mass Nt. Individuals are born as dependants (young)
and remain so from period t to period t + 1 with probability ωy and become a worker
otherwise. Workers (w) at time t remain so in period t + 1 with probability ωr and retire
otherwise. Once retired (r) the individual survives from period t to t + 1 with probability
γt,t+1. Let N
r
t be the mass of retirees, N
w
t the the mass of workers, and N
y
t the the mass
of young. Furthermore, we assume n˜t,t+1N
y
t dependants are born at period t. As a result,
population dynamics are as follows
Nyt+1 = n˜t,t+1N
y
t + ω
yNyt = (n˜t,t+1 + ω
y)Nyt = nt,t+1N
y
t , (18)
Nwt+1 = (1− ωy)Nyt + ωrNwt , (19)
N rt+1 = (1− ωr)Nwt + γt,t+1N rt . (20)
We define the measure of the stock of workers (Γywt ), which influence the innovation
process, to be equal to
Γywt ≡ (1− ωy)
Nyt
Nt
+ (1− λy)Γywt−1, (21)
where 0 < λy 6 1 denotes how much the previous stock of young that became workers before
t are important for the measure of that stock at the current period. If λy = 1 the stock is
made only of the ratio of young that just entered their working life and if λy < 1 then at time
t the stock of young is augmented by the ratio of young that entered in their working life at
time t−h with the decaying weight of (1−λy)h. As such, the stock of workers that contribute
to innovation is particularly sensitive to the stock of young dependants that become workers
(young workers) at each period, and less sensitive to more experienced workers, matching
our empirical evidence.
We assume society collects transfers from workers that are then used to sustain the young
and finance their educational investment. This expenditure will increase the effective labour
units that will be supplied by the young when they become workers. In order to define
the amount of investment in education at each period, society determines the social cost of
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obtaining resources from current period workers (a drop in their consumption at t) and the
benefits of higher effective labour supply, which leads to higher workers’ consumption in the
following periods. The society (or benevolent government) then sets the educational invest-
ment to offset its marginal cost and benefit (see the Appendix for details). The young are
thus passive in our model. Workers and retirees, on the other hand, decide their consumption
to maximise welfare subject to a budget constraint.
As in Gertler (1999), we make two key assumptions to simplify the model. An individual
faces two idiosyncratic risks during her lifetime: loss of wage income at retirement and time of
death. The impact of uncertainty about time of death is eliminated by introducing a perfect
annuity market allowing retirees to insure against this type of risk. That way, retirees turn
their wealth over to perfectly competitive financial intermediaries which invest the proceeds
and pay back a return of Rt/γt−1,t for surviving retirees. The higher return than the market
is financed by the asset holdings of retirees who did not survive.
The uncertainty about employment tenure is assumed not to affect workers since they are
risk-neutral. In order to also incorporate a motive for consumption smoothing we assume
individual preferences belong to the recursive non-expected utility family. Thus, for z =
{w, r} we assume agent j selects consumption and asset holdings to maximise
V jzt =
{
(Cjz)ρU + βzt,t+1(Et[V
j
t+1 | z]ρU )
}1/ρU
(22)
subject to
Cjzt + FA
jz
t+1 = R
z
tFA
jz
t +Wtξ
j
t I
z + dzt − τ jzt Iz (23)
where βzt,t+1 is the discount factor, which is equal to β for workers and βγt,t+1 for retirees,
Rzt is the return on assets, which is equal to Rt for workers and Rt/γt−1,t for retirees, Wt
is the wage, ξjt is the effective unit of labour supplied by worker j, and I
z is an indicator
function that takes the value one when z = w and zero otherwise, thus we assume retirees
do not work and workers’ labour supply is fixed,21 FAjzt are the assets acquired from the
financial intermediary and dzt is the dividend from the financial intermediary. Finally, τ
jz
t
is the transfer a worker j makes to society for the expenditure on the young with the total
transfer at time t given by τt =
∫ Nwt
0
τ jzt .
Let ξt be the average effective units across workers at period t, or the current level of
labour productivity/labour skill in the society. Each young who becomes a worker at the
end of period t will provide ξyt+1 effective units. We assume
ξyt+1 = ρEξt +
χE
2
(
Iyt
ξt
)2
ξt, (24)
21The framework can be extended to incorporate variable labour supply. See Gertler (1999) for details.
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where ρE < 1 and denotes the obsolescence of labour skills and I
y
t is the total effective
expenditure on the young and is defined as the ratio between total funds and their labour
cost.
Iyt =
τt
WtNwt
. (25)
Based on the population dynamics we can now determine the evolution of workers effect-
ive labour units, that is
ξt+1 = ωr
Nwt
Nwt+1
ξt + (1− ωy) N
y
t
Nwt+1
ξyt+1. (26)
4.4. Financial Intermediary
The financial intermediary sells assets to the households (FAwt , FA
r
t ), holds the capital
(Kt) and rents it to firms and lends funds (Bt+1) to innovators and adopters to finance
their expenditure (given by St and Ξt(Zt − At), respectively). Finally, we assume it owns
the innovators and adopters enterprises, receiving their dividends at the end of the period.
Thus, financial intermediary profits are
ΠFt = [r
k
t +1]Kt+RtBt−Rt(FAwt +FArt )−Kt+1−Bt+1+FAwt+1+FArt+1+
∑
x
(ΠRDt +Π
A
t ), (27)
where Bt+1 = St + Ξt(Zt − At) and FAt = FAwt + FArt .
4.5. Equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium is a tuple of endogenous predetermined variables {FAzt+1,
Kt+1, At+1, Zt+1, FAt+1, Bt+1, ξt+1} and a tuple of endogenous variables {Czt , Hwt , Twt , dzt ,
Dzt , Kt+1, Lt, Yt, Ξt, µt, N
f
t , St, Vt, Jt, λt, Π
RD
t , Π
A
t , Yt, Ct, Lt, Ut, r
k
t , δt, Rt, Π
F
t , Wt, P
M
t ,
εt, τt, I
y
t , ςt} for z = {w, r} obtained such that:
a. Workers and retirees, maximize utility subject to their budget constraint and investment
in education is such that society’s marginal cost and benefit is equated;
b. Input and final firms maximize profits, and firm entry occurs until profits are equal to
operating costs;
c. Innovators and adopters maximise their gains;
d. The financial intermediary selects assets to maximize profits, and their profits are shared
amongst retirees and workers according to their share of assets;
e. Consumption goods, capital, labour and asset markets clear;
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taking as given the initial values of all the predetermined variables {FAzt , Kt, At, Zt, ξt,
FAt, Bt} and the exogenous predetermined variables {Nyt , Nwt , N rt , Nt} specified by the
population dynamics.
Population dynamics are controlled by four exogenous variables, fertility (n˜t,t+1), the
transition probabilities into and out of the workers population (1− ωy and 1− ωr) and the
variable that controls longevity (γt,t+1). Based on that, we determine the evolution of young
dependency ratio (ζyt ), old dependency ratio (ζ
r
t ) and population growth as follows
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nt,t+1 =
ζyt+1
ζyt
(ωr + ζyt (1− ωy)) ,
ζrt+1 = ((1− ωr) + γt,t+1ζrt ) (ωr + (1− ωy)ζyt )−1 and
Nt+1
Nt
= nt,t+1 (1 + 1/ζ
y
t + ζ
r
t /ζ
y
t )
−1 + (ωr + (1− ωy)ζyt )(1 + ζrt + ζyt )−1
+
(
1− ωr
ζrt
+ γt,t+1
)
(1 + 1/ζrt + ζ
y
t /ζ
r
t )
−1 .
Another key population variable that is part of the link between demography and innov-
ation is the stock of young workers, given by
Γywt = (1− ωy)
ζyt
1 + ζyt + ζ
r
t
+ (1− λy)Γywt−1
As such, societies with a greater flow from young dependants into the working-age group
(higher (1− ωy)ζyt ) will have a bigger relative stock of young workers that contribute more
heavily to innovation. Older societies, with higher old dependency ratios ζrt , will have a
smaller relative stock of young workers, innovating less.
The key equations that describe the individuals’ behaviour are the consumption functions
of workers and retirees depicted below
Cwt = ςt[RtFA
w
t +H
w
t +D
w
t − Twt ] and
Crt = εtςt[RtFA
r
t +D
r
t ],
where, Hwt is the present value of gains from human capital, T
w
t is the present value of
transfers, Dzt is the present value of dividends for z = {w, r}, ςt the marginal propensity
of consumption of workers and εtςt the one for retirees (where εt > 1). The marginal
propensities to consume at time t are function of both ωr and γt,t+1 and are directly linked
to the expected path of interest rates. Thus, these conditions incorporate the impact of
life-cycle heterogeneity on aggregate demand and asset distribution.
22Also note that Nwt+1 = N
w
t (ω
r + (1− ωy)ζyt ) and Nrt+1 = Nrt
(
1−ωr
ζrt
+ γt,t+1
)
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Investment in human capital (Iyt ) is determined by
ς
−1/ρU
t = ς
−1/ρU
t+1 β(1− ωy)ζyt
Wt+1
Wt
χE
Iyt
ξt
and as such it reflects the trade-offs between the marginal propensity to consume of workers
today and tomorrow and the expected growth rate of wages and crucially, it depends on the
share of young relative to workers ζyt . The greater the young dependency ratio, the greater
the burden on the current generation of workers to finance human capital accumulation,
depressing investment in education.
The remaining conditions that ensure a., which define the value of the stock of human
capital, the present value of transfers, the present value of the profits of financial interme-
diaries and the evolution of the marginal propensities to consume and of the human capital
(effective labour unit ξt ) are shown in the Appendix.
The equilibrium conditions that ensure firms behave optimally determine the equilibrium
wage, the rent of capital, the utilisation rate, the intermediate good composite and their
price, the number of firms (through the entry condition), the mark-up and the depreciation
rate (See the Appendix for detail). The total production of final goods is given by
Yc,t = (N
f
t )
µt−1
[
(Ut
Kt
ξtLt
)α(ξtLt)
](1−γI)
[Mt]
γI .
The intermediate good composite Mt increases with the number of varieties At and the
number of input producers N ft . Moreover, given that the mark-up µt is greater than one,
as N ft increases total production increases. As such, demographic changes that increase
aggregate demand, generate entry and higher Yc,t.
The equilibrium conditions that refer to the innovation sector determine the stock of
invented and adopted goods, the intensity of innovation efforts, the expenditure on adoption,
its probability of success, the value of an invented and an adopted good, and finally, the
profits of inventors and adopters. The two key equilibrium conditions are the ones that pin
down the growth rate of invented goods
(
Zt+1
Zt
)
and the value of adopted goods, Vt, shown
below. The remaining conditions that ensure c. are presented in the Appendix.
Zt+1
Zt
= (Γywt )
ρywχ
(
St
Ψ˜t
)ρ
+ φ. (28)
Vt = (1− 1/ϑ)γI Yc,t
µtAt
+ (Rt+1)
−1φEtVt+1. (29)
The first equation depicts the direct link between innovation and demographics. As eco-
nomies age, Γywt decreases and hence, holding the intensity of innovation efforts St constant,
the economy will innovate less (innovation effort is less productive) depending on the size of
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ρyw, which controls the importance of young workers for innovation. The second equation
illustrate the link between innovation and aggregate conditions. Firstly, as final good pro-
duction increases, the demand for the intermediate good composite Mt (which combines all
specialised varieties) increases, and thus the gains from inventing and adopting new varieties
increase (first term on the right hand side). Secondly, given that adopters and inventors
borrow to fund investment in innovation, the equilibrium interest rate directly influences the
gains from innovation (second term on the right hand side).
The equilibrium conditions that ensure d. are the arbitrage condition that links rent of
capital to interest rates, the solution for financial intermediation realised profits and how they
are distribution across individuals and finally the solution for total loans made to innovators
and adopters. Equations are shown in the Appendix.
The market clearing equilibrium conditions determine equilibrium labour used in pro-
duction, the dynamics of the capital stock, aggregate consumption, added value output from
supply and demand sides and finally the asset market flows for retirees and workers. The
asset flow equation links consumption and demographic flows (described by the transition
probability (1− ωr)) to the evolution of the distribution of assets in the economy, as shown
below
FArt+1 = RtFA
r
t +d
r
t−Crt +(1−ωr)(RtFAwt +WtξtLt+dwt −Cwt −τt) = Kt+1 +Bt+1−FAwt+1.
Added value output is given by
Yt = Yc,t − A1−ϑt Mt − ΩΨ˜t = Ct + It + St + Ξt(Zt − At) + τt
Thus, final good production net of intermediate goods and entry costs must be equal to total
expenditure on consumption, capital, innovation and educational investments.23
Finally, we must define Ψ˜t such that a balanced growth path obtains. Comin and Gertler
(2006) select the current value of capital stock. Given that in their model the price of capital
is determined at time t, Ψ˜t fluctuates accordingly ensuring stability. We simplify our model
to consider only one sector and thus the price of capital and the value of the capital stock
are constant at t, invalidating this choice of scaling factor. We therefore select the current
value of adopted goods as our scaling factor. Thus,
Ψ˜t ≡ VtAt. (30)
23Details of the solution to all equilibrium conditions are provided in the Appendix.
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4.6. Calibration and Steady State
All quantity variables of our model grow as a result of three main drivers, the exogenously
given fertility rate (n˜), the endogenous growth of effective labour (ξt) and the endogenous
process of invention and adoption of new intermediate goods (At), which increases the pro-
ductivity of the other factors of production (capital and labour). It is convenient therefore to
normalize certain variables relative to final goods output (which is used as the numeraire),
obtaining then a system of equations that provide a stationary steady state given the set of
parameters.24
We now discuss the parameter values selected to simulate our model economy. The
standard parameters present in most macro models are presented first. Given our emphasis
on medium-run dynamics, one period in the model is set to one year. We thus set the discount
factor β equal to 0.96. Capital share (α) as usual is set to 0.33. We set depreciation (δ) to
0.08, capital utilisation (U) to 80% and the elasticity of the change in the depreciation rate
with respect to utilisation to 0.33. The share of intermediate goods (γI) is set to 0.5 and we
set mark-up in the consumption sector (µ) to 1.1. (all those parameters choices are in line
with Comin and Gertler (2006)). Finally, following Gertler (1999) we set the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (1/(1− ρU)) equal to 0.25.
We next come to the parameters that govern the innovation process. We follow Comin
and Gertler (2006) closely. We set obsolescence and productivity in innovation such that
growth rate of output per working age person is 0.024 and share of research expenditures
in total GDP is 0.012.25 That way, φ = 0.97, χ = 94.42. The mark-up for specialised
intermediate goods is set to 1.6. The elasticity of intermediate goods with respect to R&D
(ρ) is set to 0.9. Average adoption time is set to 10 years thus λ = 0.1. The elasticity of
this rate to increasing intensity (λ) is set to 0.9. The price mark-up elasticity to entry (µ)
is set to 1.
Finally, we set the parameters that govern population dynamics. We initially assume
individuals are young on average from age 0 till 20, thus setting probability of becoming a
worker (1−ωy) equal to 0.05. Individuals work from age 21 to 65, thus setting the probability
of retirement (1-ωr) equal to 0.023, and then live in retirement on average from 66 until 75,
thus setting γ equal to 0.9. That implies the ratio of young to workers is 48%, the ratio of
retirees to workers is 20% and retirees hold around 16% of the assets. Finally, we assume
workers remain part of the pool that influences invention with probability (1 − λy) = 2/3
and that ρyw = 0.9. These two last parameters directly link demographic structure and
24The final de-trended system of equations is shown in the Appendix, with the definition of the new
variables (all in lower case) all depicted (e.g. for aggregate consumption we have c = CYc,t ).
25Note that as opposed to here, in Comin and Gertler (2006) there are two sectors. Thus to obtain our
measure we combine the total expenditure in both sectors in their calibration.
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innovation, hence we verify how their variation affects our main results.
5. Results
We perform three sets of simulations to assess the impact of different demographic struc-
tures on the medium-run macroeconomy dynamics. The first simulation titled baby-boomers
analyses the effect of increasing fertility holding longevity constant. The second set of sim-
ulations, titled aging looks at the effects of increasing longevity by increasing γ and firstly
leaving population growth constant (hence fertility must reduce otherwise population nat-
urally increases) and secondly holding fertility constant and thus allowing population to
grow during the adjustment process. Finally, the third set of simulations, titled prediction,
attempt to match the change in the demographic structure predicted for a selected number
of countries in our sample during the next two decades and measure their impact on growth
and real interest rates.
Simulation: Baby-boomers
In the first simulation results, presented in Figure 4, we analyse the effect of increasing
fertility26 for the first 10 periods, reducing back to the benchmark level after that. We can
then analyse how the changes in age structure affect the economy through time, first with
an increase in dependants, then an increase in workers and finally retirees, matching closely
the responses observe in Section 3.2.27 Initially the increase in fertility leads to a decrease in
growth and investment. A high proportion of dependants is a cost to society, reducing the
resources available for workers, and thus reducing savings and investment. Moreover, current
workers also expect the growth rate to increase in the future when those youngsters join the
labour force and accordingly increase their marginal propensity to consume, reducing savings
further. As a result, during the fertility boom period, technological gains (gA) and output
growth are below their steady state level. The model therefore matches well the empirical
results that show that 0-20 share of population has a negative impact on investment, savings
and output growth.
As youngsters become workers28 and fertility decreases the share of youngsters decrease
26Instead of shocking fertility directly, we alter the replacement rate, which we obtain by calculating the
ratio between total birth (n˜Ny) and the proportion of childbearing women in the economy (40% of workers
are women and women are assumed to be of childbearing are for 20 years on average.). This proportion is
given by 20 ∗ 0.4 ∗ Nwt ×4520 , assuming 40% of workers are women and bear child between the ages of 21 to 40.
27We also perform an additional baby-boomers simulation, setting ρyw = 0.5. Fluctuations are dampened
but the main qualitative conclusions remain. See the Appendix for details.
28Note this happens at every period in the model since a proportion of (1 − ωy) dependants become
workers, in contrast to our empirical exercise depicted in Figure 3 whereby the proportion of workers only
increases after 20 years, thus our responses here are smoother, closer to the trend case shown there.
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(see periods 10 to 20) while the share of workers increase (thus, the share of retirees de-
creases). Society is then benefiting from the demographic dividends of the previous increase
in fertility. As the proportion of young workers increase (Γyw), innovation increases and the
growth rate of technology (or varieties) increases sharply, peaking 25 to 30 years after the fer-
tility burst. This increase in growth is accompanied by both, an increase in investment and
consumption. Finally, workers marginal propensity to consume continues to increase, leading
to higher real interest rates. Hence, the increasing share of workers leads to higher growth,
investment and real rates, matching the empirical estimates. Finally, as the proportion of
young dependants does not change significantly, 30 to 40 years after the increase in fertil-
ity, and the proportion of workers decrease (thus the stock of young workers is reduced),
innovation, technological gains and output growth decrease. At this point the share and
consumption of retirees (who benefited from greater asset accumulation during the higher
growth period) increase. Contrary to retirees, current workers are forced to increase their
savings relative to the previous generation reducing real rates. Lower investment and in-
novation implies that as the share of retirees increase in the final stages of the adjustment
output growth rates deviations (relative to the steady state level) become slightly negative.
Overall the model matches well the main empirical findings although the increase in the
proportion of old dependants generates a more sizable drop in output, investment and real
rates in our empirical results.
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Figure 4: Simulation: baby-boomers
Simulation: Aging
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Most economies during the period used in our estimation experienced a constant increase
in life expectancy. That has resulted in a significant increase in the share of retirees in the
population. In this set of simulations we smoothly increase the parameter γ such that
the average retiree lives an additional 10 years, increasing societies’ average age.29 We
consider two cases. The first holds population growth (gn = Nt+1/Nt) constant. As longevity
increases, ceteris paribus, population would also increase. Thus, in order to keep population
constant, fertility must decrease during the adjustment process. Note that in our estimations
demographic structure matters although we controlled for population growth, hence, by
keeping population growth constant this simulation allows us to analyse the impact of shifting
demographic structures due to aging as in the estimation. In the second case, we increase
longevity but keep fertility constant thus, while population is growing, we also obtain a shift
in demographic structure such that the share of retirees in the population increases. Results
are displayed in Figure 5.
This set of simulations allow us to highlight the three main mechanisms through which
demography impacts the economy. First, as longevity increases current workers are expected
to live longer and thus have to accordingly adjust their savings, increasing asset accumulation
during their working life. Workers’ consumption, therefore, falls leading to a decrease in
real rates. Those additional funds are allocated to investment in capital and innovation.
Capital accumulation and technological gains increase, pushing the growth rate of output
up. Therefore, life-cycle consumption adjustment, our first mechanism, leads to an increase
in growth rates. Note that our model cannot generate a paradox of thrift such that greater
desire to save decreases aggregate demand sufficiently to reduce resources such that no
additional savings is done. As a result, additional resources always flow to the innovation
sector increasing growth. Altering the aggregate demand features of the model may generate
stronger negative effects on growth due to lower consumption. A second aspect of aggregate
demand that is left out of our model which may also alter this mechanism is consumption
demand composition. Both of these aggregate demand factors may decrease the positive
response of growth we obtain in our model due to life-cycle consumption adjustments.
The second mechanism occurs through the adjustment of human capital accumulation
due to the decrease in fertility, which only materialises when aging occurs under constant
population growth - in this case the ratio of dependants to workers decrease. As work-
ers must increase saving for retirement, the total investment in the education of young
decreases. However, as the ratio of dependants decrease, the per capita investment in edu-
cation increases, leading to a growth in human capital (gξ). As expected, that pushes the
growth rate up. When fertility is kept constant, the decrease in workers resources lead to a
small decrease in the growth of human capital.
29We set ∆γt = 0.9∆γt−1 + 0.005, thus γ increases at a decreasing rate from 0.9 to 0.95 in roughly 50
years.
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Figure 5: Simulation: aging
Finally, the third mechanism goes through the invention process. As our estimation
results point out, as well as results from the literature of demographics and productivity and
innovation (see Jones (2010) and Feyrer (2008)) and demographics and entrepreneurship
(see Liang, Wang, and Lazear (2014)), young and middle age workers are relatively more
important in the innovation process relative to other age groups. Our model accounts for
that feature by assuming the stock of young workers relative to the total population impacts
the productivity of the innovation process. Due to the aging of society this relative stock
decreases, leading to a lower rate of invention and technological gains. This process is
particularly strong when longevity is coupled with decreased fertility as we observed in most
of the economies in the OECD.30 If we shutdown this mechanism, by setting ρyw = 0, the
productivity of innovation investment is independent of the demographic structure and the
growth rate in the long run increases relative to its steady state level. In this case, the human
capital accumulation and life-cycle consumption channels (when the paradox of thrift is not
present) have a permanent and positive impact on the growth rate of technology (the results
of the simulation setting ρyw = 0 and ρyw = 0.5, recall that ρyw = 0.9 in the benchmark
model, are presented in the Appendix).
Note that the first mechanism, occurring through adjustments in consumption and sav-
30Note that in the long run, fertility is equal to its steady state level in both cases, only γ changes
permanently. Thus, in both simulations in Figure 5, long-run growth decreases by the same magnitude.
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ings as a result of life-cycle changes is strongly supported by our estimations. Population
aging has been found to impact negatively interest rates. Our model indicates that this
movement in interest rates is a result of workers lowering their marginal propensity to con-
sume. Second, the third mechanism is also supported by our estimation results. Aging
leads to lower patent application and thus to potentially lower contribution of innovation
to growth. Moreover, as modelled here, this positive association between innovation and
growth is stronger for populations with a relatively younger working population. Therefore,
our theoretical model matches well the macroeconomic impacts of demographic changes but
also incorporates the main channels that our empirical results give support to.
We also perform two additional simulations for robustness.31 The first one alters λy, which
determines the persistence of the effects of the stock of workers on innovation. Increasing
λy decreases the amplitude of the fluctuations of the demographic changes but the main
qualitative results are unchanged. The second alters the flow of the stock of workers. In
the benchmark case, all youngsters who become workers influence innovation in the current
period. In the alternative specification individuals (cohorts) who contribute to innovation
must have at least 10 years of working experience. Thus, we set Γywt ≡ (1− ωy)N
y
t−10
Nt
+ (1−
λy)Γywt−1. The simulation of this alternative specification shows a smaller response for the
first 10 years, with a similar shaped response relative to the benchmark case occurring after
that. Essentially, the macroeconomic effects of the demographic changes are delayed due to
the assumed delayed effect of those changes on the innovation efforts.
Simulation: Prediction
In the final set of simulations we employ our model (we set ρyw = 0.5 for this simulations,
reducing the sensitivity of innovation to the share of young workers) to analyse the effect
of the predicted changes in the demographic structure on output growth and real interest
rates for the next two decades in a subset of the countries in our sample, matching the
prediction exercise done with the estimated model. We start by selecting three measures
of expected population dynamics to feed into the model. The first is expected population
growth (gn = Nt+1/Nt). The second is the percentage point change in the share of workers,
denoted ∆sw (following our empirical results we calculate that by obtaining the combined
population with ages between 20 and 60 years old and dividing it by total population) and
finally the third is the share of retirees (population with ages 60 and over divided by total
population, denoted by ∆sr). In order to match these three measures {gn,∆sw,∆sr}32 we
implicitly select three structural parameters, the fertility rate n˜, the longevity parameter γ
and the probability a young dependant becomes a worker (1− ωy).
31Results are shown in the Appendix.
32The share of workers in the population is given by 11+ζy+ζr and the share of retirees is given by
ζr
1+ζy+ζr
,
by setting those shares we are essentially selecting ζy and ζr, the young and retirees dependency ratios.
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Period ∆sw ∆sr g
n
2000-2005 0.5% 0.5% 1.053
2005-2011 -1.3% 2.0% 1.056
2011-2016 -1.4% 1.9% 1.043
2016-2021 -2.1% 2.2% 1.040
2021-2026 -1.3% 1.7% 1.037
2026-2031 -0.3% 0.8% 1.033
Table 8: Prediction Data Input: United States
As in the estimation exercise we use actual population data from 2000 till 2010 and
United Nations predictions from 2011 till 2031. In the prediction exercise in the empirical
section we use the long-run estimates to obtain the impact of demographic structure on the
main macroeconomic variables. As such we select the average change of our three empirical
measures of population dynamics for 5 year intervals such that some degree of endogenous
feedback due to changes in demographic variables are captured in the theoretical simulation.
As an example Table 8 shows the population measures we use for the six subperiods from
2000 till 2031 for the US.33 That implies an agent in the U.S. at time t = 2000 gets to
know that the yearly changes in population dynamics for the period 2005-20011 will be
such that in those five years population will growth 5.6 percent, the ratio of workers will
decrease by 1.3 percentage points and the ratio of retirees will increase by 2 percentage
points. We do not calibrate the steady state of the model to match any of the countries in
the sample - for all countries the initial point is the steady state of our model as discussed in
the calibration section. Hence, we only focus on how the predicted changes in demographic
structure and population growth impact the changes (or deviations from steady state) of the
macroeconomic variables in the model.
Figure 6 shows the results for U.S., Japan, Sweden and Spain, matching Figure 2 in
Section 3.2. Our model does a fairly good job in matching the predicted path of real rates
and output growth for the countries in our sample (in the Appendix we show the estimation
and theoretical simulation based on the UN predictions for four additional countries). The
model does particularly well in matching the drop in real rates and growth expected for most
of the countries during the 2010-2030 period, which occurs due to increase in aging and the
drop in labour force as fertility is reduced. The model is less able to match the empirical
predictions in the first few years (2000-2005). The main reason for the discrepancy is that
while in the empirical predictions we directly show the long-run effect of yearly changes in
demographics such that all macroeconomic interactions have taken place, in the model we
input those changes and simulate those interactions, thus it takes some years until all the
effects materialize. The differences in the first few years between theory and empirics can be
substantial for countries in which increases in working population (dividends of demographic
33In order to use the first period of the prediction (2011) we stretch one subperiod to 6 years (2005-2011).
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transition) were still occurring in 2000, as is the case in Spain. As we match those increases
output initially increases and takes time to revert. Nonetheless, as aging and low fertility
alter the demographic weights from 2005 onwards, increasing the share of old dependants
sharply in all countries, the dynamics in our model generate the expected drop in output
and real rates.
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Figure 6: Simulation: prediction
6. Conclusions
Robert Gordon (2012) asks how much further could the frontier growth rate decline?
We provide an analysis that measures this decline focusing on the impact of demographic
structure on the macroeconomy. We start by presenting a parsimonious econometric model
that aims to capture the impact of the demographic changes that currently affect nearly
all developed economies on key macroeconomic variables of interest. The use of a panel
VAR with six main macroeconomic variables, for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-
2007 allows us to obtain estimates of the long-run impact of demographic structure on the
economy. Our results indicate that the age profile of the population has both economically
and statistically significant impacts on output growth, investment, savings, hours worked
per capita, real interest rates and inflation. The magnitude of the long-term impact is large.
Demographic factors are predicted to depress average annual long-term GDP growth over
the current decade, 2010-2019, by 0.75% in our sample of OECD countries. We also provide
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evidence of the link between demographic structure and innovation activity. We find that
patent application is positively affected by middle-aged cohorts and negatively by retirees.
We generally find our empirical results to be robust to time effects, to considering per capita
output growth instead of overall output growth and the exclusion of individual countries.
Based on the empirical findings and the importance of considering the effects of demo-
graphic changes after all interactions between macroeconomic variables are allowed for, in-
cluding their effect on innovation, we develop a theoretical model that incorporates life-
cycle properties and endogenous productivity. Our model highlights three main channels by
which demographics affects the macroeconomy: i) through life-cycle consumption decisions,
ii) through incentives that alter human capital accumulation process and iii) through the
influence of young workers on the innovation process. Our model is able to replicate most of
our empirical findings, with the third channel being particularly important to generate re-
duced long-term output growth due to aging. Our empirical and theoretical results indicate
that the current trend of population aging and reduced fertility, expected to continue in the
next decades, may contribute to reduced output growth and real interest rates across OECD
economies.
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Appendix A. Data
This provides a description of the data used in the empirical study.
• World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision File 1A; Total population (both sexes
combined) by five-year age group, major area, region and country, annually for 1950-
2010 (thousands). (The data is the de facto population as of 1 July of the year indicated
and in the age group indicated and the percentage it represents with respect to the
total population.) United Nations, Population Division.
• Residential Patent Applications (annual): World Bank (2014), World Development
Indicators.
• Trademark Applications (annual): World Bank (2014), World Development Indicators.
• Central Bank Discount Rates (annual): International Financial Statistics/IMF.
• Consumer Price Index (annual): International Financial Statistics/IMF.
• Households Savings Rate (annual): National Accounts, OECD.
• Hours worked (annual): Productivity Statistics, OECD.
• Gross Domestic Product (annual): National Accounts, OECD.
• Gross Fixed Capital Formation (annual): National Accounts, OECD.
• GDP per capita (annual): Penn World Tables.
• Spot Oil Price, West Texas Intermediate (Dollars per Barrel, annual, average): Dow
Jones Company retrieved from FRED.
1
Appendix B. Additional Estimation Results
This appendix provides additional results on the estimations discussed in the main body
of the paper.
Benchmark Panel VAR
Growth (g) Investment (I) Savings (S)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
gt−1 0.21 0.07 * 0.18 0.03 * 0.04 0.05
It−1 -0.23 0.08 * 0.78 0.02 * -0.13 0.05 *
St−1 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01 * 0.81 0.02 *
Ht−1 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
rrt−1 -0.24 0.04 * -0.09 0.02 * -0.08 0.02 *
pit−1 -0.25 0.06 * -0.09 0.01 * -0.07 0.02 *
POILt−1 -0.02 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 *
POILt−2 0.02 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
popGrowth 1.94 0.86 * 0.42 0.54 1.18 0.80
popGrowtht−1 -1.72 0.84 * 0.38 0.55 -0.74 0.92
δ1 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.05
δ2 0.20 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.05 *
δ3 0.19 0.06 * 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.05
δ4 0.00 0.07 -0.00 0.04 0.10 0.08
δ5 -0.03 0.09 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07
δ6 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.18 0.09 *
δ7 -0.08 0.14 0.18 0.07 * 0.04 0.10
R2 0.26 0.87 0.82
Pr(δj = 0) 0.00 0.00 0.00
obs 686 686 686
Table A.1: Results for Growth, Investment and Savings
Hours (H) Real Rates (rr) Inflation (pi)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
gt−1 0.29 0.04 * 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06
It−1 -0.03 0.04 -0.27 0.19 0.21 0.13
St−1 0.05 0.03 -0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11
Ht−1 0.92 0.01 * 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.05
rrt−1 -0.12 0.04 * 0.73 0.09 * -0.11 0.05 *
pit−1 -0.09 0.03 * 0.15 0.10 0.56 0.04 *
POILt−1 -0.01 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 *
POILt−2 0.01 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 *
popGrowth -0.51 1.43 -2.50 1.40 3.09 1.55 *
popGrowtht−1 0.57 1.45 2.00 1.57 -2.87 1.49
δ1 -0.17 0.06 * -0.46 0.19 * 0.48 0.13 *
δ2 -0.03 0.09 -0.07 0.13 0.14 0.09
δ3 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.16 -0.10 0.08
δ4 0.21 0.07 * 0.37 0.15 * -0.40 0.15 *
δ5 -0.05 0.07 0.26 0.10 * -0.34 0.13 *
δ6 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.22 -0.10 0.17
δ7 0.00 0.07 0.24 0.36 -0.07 0.29
R2 0.93 0.63 0.74
Pr(δj = 0) 0.00 0.00 0.00
obs 686 686 686
Table A.2: Results for Hours, Real Interest Rate, and Inflation
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g I S H rr pi
g 1.000 0.541 0.441 0.451 -0.134 0.272
I 0.541 1.000 0.036 0.331 -0.067 0.157
S 0.441 0.036 1.000 0.258 -0.062 0.036
H 0.451 0.331 0.258 1.000 -0.009 0.158
rr -0.134 -0.067 -0.062 -0.009 1.000 -0.762
pi 0.272 0.157 0.036 0.158 -0.762 1.000
Table A.3: Residual Correlation Matrix
Robustness: Time Effects
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
g -0.087 0.122 0.092 0.070 0.175 -0.064 -0.283* 0.000
I -0.671* -0.018 0.202 0.222 0.417 0.197 0.536 -0.832*
S 0.319 0.882* -0.053 0.393 0.114 0.128 0.017 -1.382*
H -2.309* 0.166 0.757 2.935* 0.887 0.486 -1.353 -1.126
rr -0.564 -0.104 0.457 0.498 -0.083 0.430 0.097 -0.910
pi 0.824* 0.333 -0.353 -0.892* -0.194 -0.055 -0.101 0.339
Note: ∗ = 5% level of significance.
Table A.4: Long-Run Demographic Impact - DLR (two-way effects)
Workers Dependants Difference
g p(
∑5
j=2 δj = 0)=0.005 p(δ1 + δ7 = 0)=0.052 p(
∑5
j=2 δj = δ1 + δ7)=0.008
I p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.229 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.005 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.012
S p(
∑6
j=4 δj = 0)=0.307 p(δ7 + δ8 = 0)=0.015 p(
∑6
j=4 δj = δ7 + δ8)=0.061
H p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.000 p(δ1 +
∑8
j=7 δj = 0)=0.001 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 +
∑8
j=7 δj)=0.000
rr p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.094 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.150 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.079
pi p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.002 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.0520 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.007
Table A.5: Joint Tests - p-values of Nonlinear Wald Test (two-way effects)
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Robustness: Per Capita Output
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
gpc -0.003 0.113 0.068 0.030 0.099 -0.028 -0.244** -0.035
I -0.526 0.219 0.225 0.240 0.011 0.262 0.408 -0.838
S 0.064 0.501 -0.333 0.255 0.396 0.624** -0.124 -1.383*
H -2.04** 0.029 0.502 2.64* 0.292 1.256 -1.498 -1.182
rr -0.915 -0.293 0.473 0.866 0.361 0.163 0.247 -0.903
pi 1.14* 0.606** -0.283 -1.006* -0.732* 0.005 -0.049 0.320
Note: ∗∗ = 10%, ∗ = 5% levels of significance.
Table A.6: Long-Run Demographic Impact - DLR (Per Capita Output)
Workers Dependants Difference
gpc p(
∑5
j=2 δj = 0)=0.096 p(δ7 = 0)=0.090 p(
∑5
j=2 δj = δ7)=0.039
I p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.290 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.056 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.078
S p(
∑6
j=4 δj = 0)=0.009 p(δ7 + δ8 = 0)=0.027 p(
∑6
j=4 δj = δ7 + δ8)=0.011
H p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.023 p(δ1 +
∑8
j=7 δj = 0)=0.024 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 +
∑8
j=7 δj)=0.014
rr p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.075 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.129 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.073
pi p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.001 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.018 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.002
Table A.7: Joint Tests - p-values of Nonlinear Wald Test (Per Capita Output)
Robustness: Exogeneity Test
Table A.8 shows the estimated coefficients of matrices Aendo (top left partition), Bendo
(top right partition), B1 (bottom left partition) and B2 (bottom right partition) for the
specification where Wit are considered endogenous.
g I S H rr pi W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7
g 0.21* -0.23* 0.06 0.01 -0.23* -0.25* -0.06 0.24* 0.14 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.14
I 0.18* 0.78* 0.03 0.01 -0.09* -0.09* -0.07* 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.08* 0.08 0.14*
S 0.04 -0.12* 0.81* -0.01 -0.08* -0.07* -0.06 0.18* -0.04 0.14* 0.03 0.2* -0.05
H 0.29* -0.02 0.05* 0.92* -0.12* -0.09* -0.16* -0.03 0.09 0.19* -0.07 0.10 -0.06
rr 0.04 -0.27* -0.14* 0.04 0.73* 0.15* -0.47* -0.03 0.18 0.41* 0.19 0.19 0.19
pi 0.03 0.22* 0.12* -0.01 -0.11* 0.56* 0.49* 0.13 -0.11 -0.42* -0.32* -0.10 -0.10
W1 0.000 -0.002 -0.005* -0.001 0.004* 0.006* 1.01* -0.05* 0.04* -0.01 0.02* -0.01* -0.04*
W2 0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.001 0.08* 0.99* -0.09* 0.04* -0.02* 0.05* -0.05*
W3 0.006* -0.003 -0.002 0.002* 0.005* 0.004* -0.06* 0.13* 0.97* -0.05* 0.03* 0.01* -0.04*
W4 0.000 -0.004* -0.005* -0.002* -0.001 0.000 0.01* -0.03* 0.11* 0.99* -0.07* 0.06* -0.08*
W5 0.003 0.004 -0.004* 0.002 0.011* 0.007* -0.03* 0.05* -0.06* 0.12* 0.97* -0.05* -0.01
W6 0.005* -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.003* 0.000 0.02* -0.01* 0.03* -0.02* 0.09* 1* -0.16*
W7 0.007* -0.005* -0.006* 0.000 0.007* 0.005* -0.03* 0.04* -0.03* 0.04* -0.03* 0.12* 0.94*
Note: ∗ = 5% level of significance.
Table A.8: Exogeneity Test
Appendix C. Patent Application and Age Structure
Panel VAR Estimation - Introducing Innovation Variables
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Growth (g) Investment (I) Savings (S)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
gt−1 0.24 0.08 * 0.18 0.03 * 0.06 0.05
It−1 -0.26 0.08 * 0.77 0.02 * -0.14 0.05 *
St−1 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.01 * 0.80 0.03 *
Ht−1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01
rrt−1 -0.24 0.05 * -0.09 0.02 * -0.08 0.02 *
R&DPAt−1 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
pit−1 -0.26 0.06 * -0.09 0.01 * -0.07 0.02 *
POILt−1 -0.02 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 *
POILt−2 0.01 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
popGrowtht 1.75 0.85 * 0.05 0.51 0.88 0.81
popGrowtht−1 -1.58 0.85 0.77 0.50 -0.54 0.99
δ1 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.06
δ2 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.05 *
δ3 0.21 0.06 * 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.06
δ4 0.00 0.08 -0.00 0.04 0.10 0.08
δ5 -0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07
δ6 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.10
δ7 -0.02 0.16 0.20 0.08 * 0.07 0.11
R2 0.28 0.87 0.82
Pr(δj = 0) 0.00 0.00 0.00
obs 614 614 614
Table A.9: Results for Growth, Investment and Savings
Hours (H) Real Rates (rr) R&D (R&DPA) Inflation (pi)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
gt−1 0.30 0.04 * 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.07
It−1 -0.04 0.04 -0.30 0.21 0.38 0.24 0.22 0.15
St−1 0.05 0.03 -0.16 0.13 -0.30 0.15 * 0.13 0.12
Ht−1 0.92 0.01 * 0.05 0.09 -0.14 0.11 -0.01 0.06
rrt−1 -0.12 0.04 * 0.71 0.10 * -0.36 0.21 -0.10 0.06
R&DPAt−1 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 * -0.19 0.05 * -0.03 0.00 *
pit−1 -0.09 0.03 * 0.13 0.10 -0.06 0.17 0.57 0.05 *
POILt−1 -0.01 0.00 * 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 *
POILt−2 0.01 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
popGrowtht -0.58 1.58 -2.28 1.55 1.13 8.80 2.73 1.54
popGrowtht−1 0.60 1.58 1.58 1.57 0.21 9.99 -2.49 1.41
δ1 -0.15 0.07 * -0.41 0.20 * 0.15 0.71 0.47 0.14 *
δ2 -0.05 0.09 -0.13 0.16 -0.73 0.54 0.14 0.10
δ3 0.08 0.07 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.56 -0.10 0.09
δ4 0.20 0.07 * 0.34 0.15 * 0.70 0.43 -0.40 0.15 *
δ5 -0.05 0.08 0.25 0.10 * 0.99 0.50 * -0.35 0.13 *
δ6 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.24 -1.29 0.96 -0.11 0.17
δ7 0.05 0.07 0.35 0.41 0.18 0.92 -0.13 0.33
R2 0.93 0.62 0.08 0.73
Pr(δj = 0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
obs 614 614 614 614
Table A.10: Results for Hours, Interest Rate, R&D and Inflation
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Figure A.1: Impact of Predicted Future Demographic Structure - Additional Countries
Workers Dependants Difference
g p(
∑5
j=2 δj = 0)=0.102 p(δ1 + δ7 = 0)=0.136 p(
∑5
j=2 δj = δ1 + δ7)=0.085
I p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.297 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.051 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.078
S p(
∑6
j=4 δj = 0)=0.005 p(δ7 + δ8 = 0)=0.000 p(
∑6
j=4 δj = δ7 + δ8)=0.001
H p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.047 p(δ1 +
∑8
j=7 δj = 0)=0.037 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 +
∑8
j=7 δj)=0.023
rr p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.063 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.153 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.072
R&DPA p(
∑6
j=4 δj = 0)=0.066 p(δ2 + δ8 = 0)=0.211 p(
∑6
j=4 δj = δ2 + δ8)=0.000
pi p(δ3 + δ4 = 0)=0.005 p(δ1 + δ8 = 0)=0.060 p(δ3 + δ4 = δ1 + δ8)=0.011
Table A.11: Joint Tests - p-values of Nonlinear Wald Test - Innovation Extension
Appendix D. Theoretical Model: Solution of Equilib-
rium Conditions
This appendix shows how the equilibrium conditions are determined.
We start by looking at the factor markets with the final and input firms decisions.
Production Sector
Firms in consumption and capital producing sectors maximise profits selecting capital,
its utilisation, labour and intermediate goods demand.
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Labour allocation is such that
(1− α)(1− γI)Yc,t = µtWtξtLt. (A.1)
Capital stock and utilisation are such that
α(1− γI)Yc,t = µt[rkt + δ(Ut)]Kt, (A.2)
α(1− γI)Yc,t = µtδ′(Ut)KtUt. (A.3)
Where It is the investment in capital made by the financial intermediary, who holds all
production and R& D assets. Intermediate goods are set such that
µtMtP
M
t = γIYc,t (A.4)
where PMt is the price of intermediate goods.
In order to obtain this price one can minimise total cost of intermediary goods
∫ A
0
P˜MM idi
subject to (9) to obtain
PMt = ϑA
1−ϑ
t (A.5)
Combining (7) and (8) and defining total labour supply as Lt ≡
∫ Nft
0
Ljtdj and total
intermediate composite demand as Mt ≡
∫ Nft
0
M jt dj, then
34
Yt = (N
f
t )
µt−1
[
(Ut
Kt
ξtLt
)α(ξtLt)
](1−γI)
[Mt]
γI for x = c, k. (A.6)
Due to free entry the number of final good firms is such that their profits are equal to the
operating costs. Using (7) total output per firm is given by Yt(N
f
t )
−µt , while their mark-up
is given by µt−1
µt
, thus
µt − 1
µt
Yc,t(N
f
t )
−µt = ΩΨ˜t (A.7)
Finally, let Yt denote aggregate value added output. Yt is equal to the total output net
intermediate goods and operating costs. Thus, using (A.5)35,
Yt = Yc,t − A1−ϑt Mt − ΩΨ˜t. (A.8)
On the expenditure side, output must be equal to consumption, investment and costs of
R&D and adoption. Thus,
34Note that all firms select the same capital labour ratio.
35In order to net out intermediate goods one has to compute total expenditure on intermediate goods
(
∫ A
0
P˜MM idi ) minus the markup on intermediate goods (
∫ A
0
(P˜M − 1)M idi).
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Yt = Ct + It + St + Ξt(Zt − At) + τt. (A.9)
Innovation Process
From conditions (10) and (15) one can easily determine the flow of the stock of invented
(prototypes) and adopted goods, which are given by
Zt+1
Zt
= χ
(
St
Ψ˜t
)ρ
+ φ, and (A.10)
At+1
At
= λ
(
AtΞt
Ψ˜t
)
φ[Zt/At − 1] + φ (A.11)
Investment in R&D (St) is determined by (11), which using (10) becomes
St = R
−1
t+1φEtJt+1(Zt+1 − φZt). (A.12)
Profits are given by the total gain in seeling the right to goods invented as a result
of the previous period investment Sx,t−1 to adopters minus the cost of borrowing for that
investment. Thus,
ΠRDt = φJt(Zt − φZt−1) + St−1Rt
Thus, in perfect foresight equilibrium ΠRDt = 0.
Investment in adoption (Ξt) is determined by solving (14). We thus obtain the following
condition
At
Kt
λ′R−1t φ[Vt+1 − Jt+1] = 1 (A.13)
where At
Kt
λ′ =
∂λ
(
At
Ψ˜t
)
∂ΞtΞt
. Assuming the elasticity of λt to changes in Ξt is constant, thus
λ =
λ′
λt
AtΞt
Kt
, then we obtain
Ξt = λλtR
−1
t φ[Vt+1 − Jt+1] (A.14)
Finally, the value of an invented good and an adopted good are given by
Jt = −Ξt + (Rt+1)−1φEt[λtVt+1 + (1− λt)Jt+1], and (A.15)
Vt = (1− 1/ϑ)γI Yc,t
µtAt
+ (Rt+1)
−1φEtVt+1 (A.16)
where λt = λ
(
AtΞt
Ψ˜t
)
and Πm,t = (1− 1/ϑ)PMt Mt = (1− 1/ϑ)γI Yc,tµtAt .
Profits for adopters are given by the gain from marketing specialised intermediated goods
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net the amount paid to inventors to gain access to new goods and the expenditures on loans
to pay for adoption intensity.
ΠAt = (1− 1/ϑ)γI
Yc,t
µt
− Jt(Zt − φZt−1)− Ξt−1(Zt−1 − At−1)Rt
Household Sector
Retiree j decision problem is
maxV jrt =
{
(Cjrt )
ρU + βγt,t+1([V
jr
t+1]
ρU )
}1/ρU
(A.17)
subject to
Cjrt + FA
jr
t+1 =
Rt
γt−1,t
FAjrt + d
jr
t . (A.18)
The first order condition and envelop theorem are
(Cjrt )
ρU−1 = βγt,t+1
∂V jrt+1
∂FAjrt+1
(V jrt+1)
ρU−1, (A.19)
∂V jrt
∂FAjrt
= (V jrt+1)
1−ρU (Cjrt )
ρU−1 Rt
γt−1,t
. (A.20)
Combining these conditions above gives the Euler equation
Cjrt+1 = (βRt+1)
1/(1−ρU )Cjrt (A.21)
Conjecture that retirees consume a fraction of all assets (including financial assets, profits
from financial intermediaries), such that
Cjrt = εtςt
[
Rt
γt−1,t
FArjt +D
rj
t
]
. (A.22)
Combining these and the budget constraint gives
FAjrt+1 =
Rt
γt−1,t
FAjrt (1− εtςt) + djrt − εtςt(Drjt ).
Using the condition above the Euler equation and the solution for consumption gives
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(βRt+1)
1/(1−ρU )εtςt[
Rt
γt−1,t
FArjt +D
rj
t ] = (A.23)
εt+1ςt+1
[
Rt+1
γt,t+1
(
Rt
γt−1,t
FAjrt (1− εtςt) + djrt − εtςtDrjt
)
+Djrt+1
]
.
Collecting terms we have that
1− εtςt = (βRt+1)
1/(1−ρU )γt,t+1
Rt+1
εtςt
εt+1ςt+1
, (A.24)
Djrt = d
jr
t +
γt,t+1
Rt+1
Djrt+1. (A.25)
One can also show that V jrt = (εtςt)
−1/ρUCjrt .
Worker j decision problem is
maxV jwt =
{
(Cjwt )
ρU + β[ωrV jwt+1 + (1− ωr)V jrt+1]ρU
}1/ρU
(A.26)
subject to
Cjwt + FA
jw
t+1 = RtFA
jw
t +Wtξt + d
jw
t − τ jwt . (A.27)
First order conditions and envelop theorem are
(Cjwt )
ρU−1 = β[ωrV jwt+1 + (1− ωr)V jrt+1]ρU−1
[
ωr
∂V jwt+1
∂FAjwt+1
+ (1− ωr) ∂V
jr
t+1
∂FAjwt+1
]
,
∂V jwt
∂FAjwt
= (V jwt+1)
1−ρU (Cjwt )
ρU−1Rt, and (A.28)
∂V jrt
∂FAjwt
=
∂V jrt
∂FAjrt
∂FAjrt
∂FAjwt
=
∂V jrt
∂FAjrt
1
γt−1,t
= (V jrt+1)
1−ρU (Cjrt )
ρU−1Rt. (A.29)
∂FAjrt
∂FAjwt
= 1
γt−1,t
since as individuals are risk neutral with respect to labour income they select
the same asset profile independent of their worker/retiree status, adjusting only for expected
return due to probability of death.
Combining these conditions above, and using the conjecture that V jwt = (ςt)
−1/ρUCjwt ,
gives the Euler equation
Cjwt =
(
(βRt+1Zt+1)
1/(1−ρU ))−1 [ωrCjwt+1 + (1− ωr)ε−1ρUt+1Cjrt+1] (A.30)
where Zt+1 = (ω
r + (1− ωr)ε(ρU−1)/ρUt+1 ).
Conjecture that retirees consume a fraction of all assets (including financial assets, human
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capital and profits from financial intermediaries), such that
Cjwt = ςt[RtFA
jw
t +H
jw
t +D
jw
t − T jwt ]. (A.31)
Following the same procedure as before we have that
ςt[RtFA
jw
t +H
jw
t +D
jw
t ](βRt+1Zt+1)
1/(1−ρU )= (A.32)
ωrςt+1[Rt+1(RtFAjwt (1−ςt)+Wtξt+djwt −τ jwt −ςt(Hjwt +Djwt −T jwt ))+Hjwt+1+Djwt+1−T jwt+1]+
ε
−1
ρU
t+1(1−ωr)εt+1ςt+1[Rt+1(RtFAjwt (1−ςt)+Wtξt+djwt −τ jwt −ςt(Hjwt +Djwt −T jwt ))+Djrt+1].
Collecting terms and simplifying we have that
ςt = 1− ςt
ςt+1
(βRt+1Zt+1)
1/(1−ρU )
Rt+1Zt,t+1
(A.33)
Hjwt = Wtξt +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hjwt+1 (A.34)
T jwt = τ
jw
t +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
T jwt+1 and (A.35)
Djwt = d
jw
t +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Djwt+1 +
(1− ω)ε(ρU−1)/ρUt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Djrt+1. (A.36)
Aggregation across households
Assume that for any variable Xjzt we have that X
z
t =
∫ Nzt
0
Xjzt for z = {w, r}, then
Lt = N
w
t , (A.37)
Hwt = WtξtLt +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hwt+1
Nwt
Nwt+1
, (A.38)
Twt = τt +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Twt+1
Nwt
Nwt+1
, (A.39)
Dwt = d
w
t +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Dwt+1
Nwt
Nwt+1
+
(1− ωr)ε(ρU−1)/ρUt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Drt+1
Nwt
N rt+1
, (A.40)
Cwt = ςt[RtFA
w
t +H
w
t +D
w
t − Twt ], (A.41)
Drt = d
r
t +
γt,t+1
Rt+1
Drt+1
N rt
N rt+1
, (A.42)
Crt = εtςt[RtFA
r
t +D
r
t ]. (A.43)
Note that γt,t+1 is not shown in the last equation due to the perfect annuity market for
retirees, allowing for the redistribution of assets of retirees who died at the end of the period.
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Decision of Investment in Labour Skill
The marginal cost of increasing lump-sum taxes for worker j today to finance higher
investment in young’s education is given by
MCEjt = −
∂V wjt
∂τwjt
=
∂V wjt
∂Cwjt
= ς
−1/ρU
t (A.44)
The marginal benefit of increasing lump-sum taxes at time t for a young h who becomes
a worker next period is
MBEht = β(1− ωy)
∂V wht+1
∂τwjt
= β(1− ωy)∂V
wh
t+1
∂ξyt+1
∂ξyt+1
∂Iyt
∂Iyt
∂τt
∂τt
∂τwjt
(A.45)
= β(1− ωy)ς−1/ρUt+1
Wt+1
Wt
χE
Iyt
ξt
(A.46)
Adding costs across all workers and benefits across all young at time t gives the condition
that determines Iyt . That is
ς
−1/ρU
t = β(1− ωy)ς−1/ρUt+1 ζyt
Wt+1
Wt
χE
Iyt
ξt
(A.47)
Financial Intermediary
Due to standard arbitrage arguments all assets must pay same expected return thus
Et
[
rkt+1 + 1
]
= Rt. (A.48)
The flow of capital is then given by
Kt+1 = Kt(1− δ(Ut)) + It. (A.49)
Also note that under a perfect foresight solution this equality holds without expectations,
ΠFt = 0 and thus d
r
t = d
w
t = 0. If Π
F
t 6= 0, then we assume profits are divided based on the
ratio of assets thus drt = Π
F
t
FArt
FArt+FA
w
t
and dwt = Π
F
t
FAwt
FArt+FA
w
t
.
Asset Markets
Asset Market clearing implies
FAt+1 = FA
w
t+1 + FA
r
t+1 = Kt+1 +Bt+1 (A.50)
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Finally, the flow of assets are given by
FArt+1 = RtFA
r
t + d
r
t − Crt + (1− ωr)(RtFAwt +WtξtLt + dwt − Cwt − τt) (A.51)
FAwt+1 = ω
r(RtFA
w
t +WtξtLt + d
w
t − Cwt − τt) (A.52)
Appendix E. Theoretical Model: Equilibrium condi-
tions
The equilibrium conditions that ensure a. are:
Hwt = WtξtLt +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hwt+1
Nwt
Nwt+1
(A.53a)
Twt = τt +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Twt+1
Nwt
Nwt+1
(A.53b)
Dwt = d
w
t +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Dwt+1
Nwt
Nwt+1
+
(1− ωr)ε(ρU−1)/ρUt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Drt+1
Nwt
N rt+1
(A.53c)
Drt = d
r
t +
γt,t+1
Rt+1
Drt+1
N rt
N rt+1
(A.53d)
Cwt = ςt[RtFA
w
t +H
w
t +D
w
t − Twt ] (A.53e)
Crt = εtςt[RtFA
r
t +D
r
t ] (A.53f)
ςt = 1− ςt
ςt+1
(βRt+1Zt+1)
1/(1−ρU )
Rt+1Zt,t+1
(A.53g)
1− εtςt = (βRt+1)
1/(1−ρU )γt,t+1
Rt+1
εtςt
εt+1ςt+1
(A.53h)
τt = WtN
w
t I
y
t (A.53i)
ξt+1 = (ω
r + (1− ωy)ζyt )−1(ωrξt + (1− ωy)ζyt ξyt+1) (A.53j)
ξyt+1 = ρEξt +
χE
2
(
Iyt
ξt
)2
ξt. (A.53k)
ς
−1/ρU
t = ς
−1/ρU
t+1 β(1− ωy)ζyt
Wt+1
Wt
χE
Iyt
ξt
(A.53l)
where Zt+1 = ω
r + (1− ωr)ε(ρU−1)/ρUt+1 , Hwt is the present value of gains from human capital,
Twt is the present value of transfers, D
z
t is the present value of dividends for z = {w, r}, ςt
the marginal propensity of consumption of workers and εtςt the one for retirees.
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The equilibrium conditions that ensure b. are:
(1− α)(1− γI)Yc,t = µtWtξtLt (A.54a)
α(1− γI)Yc,t = µt[rkt + δt]Kt (A.54b)
α(1− γI)Yc,t = µtδ′t(Ut)KtUt (A.54c)
µtMtP
M
t = γIYc,t (A.54d)
PMt = ϑA
1−ϑ
t (A.54e)
Yc,t = (N
f
t )
µt−1
[
(Ut
Kt
ξtLt
)α(ξtLt)
](1−γI)
[Mt]
γI (A.54f)
µt − 1
µt
Yc,t(N
f
t )
−µt = ΩΨ˜t (A.54g)
µt = µ(N
f
t ) (A.54h)
δt = δ(Ut) (A.54i)
The equilibrium conditions that ensure c. are:
Zt+1
Zt
= (Γywt )
ρywχ
(
St
Ψ˜t
)ρ
+ φ (A.55a)
At+1
At
= λ
(
AtΞt
Ψ˜t
)
φ[Zt/At − 1] + φ (A.55b)
St = R
−1
t+1φEtJt+1(Zt+1 − φZt) (A.55c)
Ξt = λλtR
−1
t+1φ[Vt+1 − Jt+1] (A.55d)
Jt = −Ξt + (Rt+1)−1φEt[λtVt+1 + (1− λt)Jt+1] (A.55e)
Vt = (1− 1/ϑ)γI Yc,t
µtAt
+ (Rt+1)
−1φEtVt+1 (A.55f)
λt = λ
(
AtΞt
Ψ˜t
)
(A.55g)
ΠRDt = φJt(Zt − φZt−1)− St−1Rt (A.55h)
ΠAt = (1− 1/ϑ)γI
Yc,t
µt
− φJt(Zt − φZt−1)− Ξt−1(Zt−1 − At−1)Rt (A.55i)
The equilibrium conditions that ensure d. are:
Et[r
k
t+1 + 1] = Rt+1 (A.56a)
dzt = Π
F
t
FAzt
FAt
for z = r, w (A.56b)
ΠFt = [r
k
t + 1]Kt +RtBt −Rt(FAt)−Kt+1 −Bt+1 + FAt+1 + ΠRDt + ΠAt (A.56c)
Bt+1 = St + Ξt(Zt − At) (A.56d)
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The equilibrium conditions that ensure e. are:
Lt = N
w
t (A.57a)
Kt+1 = Kt(1− δ(Ut)) + It (A.57b)
Yt = Yc,t − A1−ϑt Mt − ΩΨ˜t (A.57c)
Yt = Ct + It + St + Ξt(Zt − At) + τt (A.57d)
Ct = C
w
t + C
r
t (A.57e)
FAwt+1 + FA
r
t+1 = Kt+1 +Bt+1 (A.57f)
FArt+1 = RtFA
r
t + d
r
t − Crt + (1− ωr)(RtFAwt +WtξtLt + dwt − Cwt − τt) (A.57g)
FAt+1 = FA
w
t+1 + FA
r
t+1 (A.57h)
Also note that FAwt+1 = ω
r(RtFA
w
t +WtξtLt + d
w
t − Cwt − τt).
Appendix F. Theoretical Model: Detrended equilib-
rium conditions
This section shows the detrended equilibrium conditions. Note that x¯ denotes the steady
state of variable xt.
15
hwt = wt +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
gt+1h
w
t+1
gwt+1
where hwt =
Hwt
Yc,t
, wt =
WtξtLt
Yc,t
, gt+1 =
Yc,t+1
Yc,t
, gwt+1 =
Nwt+1
Nwt
(A.58a)
T˜wt = τ˜t +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
gt+1T˜
w
t+1
gwt+1
where T˜wt =
Twt
Yc,t
, τ˜t =
τt
Yc,t
(A.58b)
D˜rt = d˜
r
t +
γt,t+1
Rt+1
gt+1
D˜rt+1ζ
r
t
ζrt+1g
w
t+1
where D˜rt =
Drt
Yc,t
, d˜rt =
drt
Yc,t
(A.58c)
D˜wt = d˜
w
t +
ωr
Rt+1Zt,t+1
gt+1D˜
w
t+1
gwt+1
+
(1− ωr)ε(ρU−1)/ρUt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
gt+1D˜
r
t+1
ζrt+1g
w
t+1
where D˜wt =
Dwt
Yc,t
, d˜wt =
dwt
Yc,t
(A.58d)
cwt = ςt[Rt
fawt
gt
+ hwt + D˜
w
t − T˜wt ] where fawt =
FAwt
Yc,t−1
, cwt =
Cwt
Yc,t
(A.58e)
crt = εtςt[Rt
fart
gt
+ D˜rt ] where fa
r
t =
FArt
Yc,t−1
, crt =
Cwt
Yc,t
(A.58f)
1− εtςt = (βRt+1)
1/(1−ρU )γt,t+1
Rt+1
εtςt
εt+1ςt+1
(A.58g)
ςt = 1− ςt
ςt+1
(βRt+1Zt+1)
1
(1−ρU )
Rt+1Zt,t+1
(A.58h)
Zt+1 = (ω
r + (1− ωr)ε(ρU−1)/ρUt+1 ) (A.58i)
gwt+1 = ω
r + (1− ωy)ζyt (A.59a)
nt,t+1 =
ζyt+1
ζyt
(ωr + ζyt (1− ωy)) (A.59b)
ζrt+1 = ((1− ωr) + γt,t+1ζrt ) (ωr + (1− ωy)ζyt )−1 and (A.59c)
gnt+1 = (nt,t+1ζ
y
t ) + (ω
r + (1− ωy)ζyt ) + ((1− ωr) + γt,t+1ζrt )(1 + ζrt + ζyt )−1 where gnt+1 =
Nt+1
Nt
(A.59d)
gξt+1 = (g
w
t+1)
−1(ωr + (1− ωy)ζyt
(
ρE +
χE
2
(iyt )
2
)
where gξt+1 =
ξt+1
ξt
, iyt =
Iyt
ξt
(A.59e)
τ˜t = i
y
twt (A.59f)
ς
−1/ρU
t = ς
−1/ρU
t+1 β(1− ωy)ζyt χEiyt
wt+1gt+1
wtgwt+1
(A.59g)
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(1− α)(1− γI) = µtwt (A.60a)
α(1− γI) = µt[rkt + δ(Ut)]kt/gt where kt =
Kt
Yc,t−1
(A.60b)
α(1− γI) = µtδ′tktUt/gt (A.60c)
gt =
µt
µt−1
gMt (g
A
t )
1−ϑ where gMt =
Mt
Mt−1
, gAt =
At
At−1
(A.60d)
gt =
(N ft )
µt−1
(N ft−1)µt−1−1
(
Utkt
Ut−1kt−1
gt−1
)α(1−γI) (
gξt g
w
t
)(1−α)(1−γI)
(gMt )
γI (A.60e)
µt − 1
µt
(N ft )
−µt = bΨt where Ψt =
Ψ˜t
Yc,t
(A.60f)
µt = µ(N
f
t ) ≈ µ¯
(
1 +
µ
N¯ f
(N ft − N¯ f )
)
where µ is the elasticity of µ(·) (A.60g)
δt = δ¯ + δ
′
t(Ut − U¯) (A.60h)
δ′t = δ¯′ + δ
′′(Ut − U¯) (A.60i)
za,t+1
za,t
gAt+1 = χ
(st
Ψ t
)ρ
+ φ where za,t =
Zt
At
, st =
St
Yc,t
(A.61a)
gAt+1 = λtφ[za,t − 1] + φ (A.61b)
st = gt+1R
−1
t+1φjt+1
(
1− φ za,t
za,t+1gAt+1
)
where jt =
JtZt
Yt
(A.61c)
vt =
(1− 1/ϑ)γI
µt
+ (Rt+1)
−1φ
gt+1
gAt+1
vt+1 where vt =
VtAt
Yt
(A.61d)
$t = λλtR
−1
t+1φ
za,tgt+1
gAt+1
[
vt+1 − jt+1
zat+1
]
where $t =
ΞtZt
Yt
(A.61e)
jt = −$t + (Rt+1)−1φza,tgt+1
gAt+1
[
λtvt+1 + (1− λt) jt+1
za,t+1
]
(A.61f)
λt = λ
(
$t
za,tΨt
)
≈ λ¯
(
1 + λ
(
$t − $¯
$¯
− za,t − z¯a
z¯a
− Ψt − Ψ¯
Ψ¯
))
(A.61g)
piAt =
(1− 1/ϑ)γI
µt
− φjt
(
1− φ za,t−1
za,tgAt
)
−Rt$t−1(1− 1/za,t−1)/gt (A.61h)
piRDt = φjt
(
1− φ za,t−1
za,tgAt
)
−Rtst−1/gt (A.61i)
where λ is the elasticity of λ(·)
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rkt+1 + 1 = Rt+1 (A.62a)
d˜rt = pi
F
t
fart
fat
where piFt =
ΠFt
Yc,t
(A.62b)
d˜wt = pi
F
t
fawt
fat
(A.62c)
bt+1 = st +$t(1− 1/za,t) where bt+1 = Bt+1
Yc,t
(A.62d)
piFt = (Rkt + 1)
kt
gt
+
Rt
gt
bt − Rt
gt
(fat)− kt+1 − bt+1 + (fat+1) + piAt + piRDt (A.62e)
kt+1 = (1− δ(Ut))kt
gt
+ it where it =
It
Yc,t
(A.63a)
yt = (1− γI/(ϑµt))− bΨt where yt = Yt
Yc,t
(A.63b)
yt = ct + it + st +$t(1− 1/za,t) + τ˜t where ct = Ct
Yc,t
(A.63c)
ct = c
w
t + c
r
t (A.63d)
fawt+1 + fa
r
t+1 = kt+1 + bt+1 (A.63e)
fart+1 =
Rt
gt
fart + d˜
r
t − crt + (1− ωr)
(
Rt
gt
fawt + wt + d˜
w
t − cwt − τ˜t
)
(A.63f)
fat+1 = fa
w
t+1 + fa
r
t+1 (A.63g)
Ψt = vt (A.63h)
fawt+1 = ω
r
(
Rt
gt
fawt + wt + d˜
w
t − cwt − τ˜t
)
Appendix G. Theoretical Model: Additional Simula-
tions
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Figure A.2: Simulation: benchmark aging versus different ρyw
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Figure A.3: Simulation: benchmark Baby-boomers versus ρyw = 0.5
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Figure A.4: Simulation: benchmark aging versus different λy = 1/10
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Figure A.5: Simulation: benchmark aging versus Delayed flow of inventors
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Figure A.6: Simulation: prediction - Additional Countries
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